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ARBITRARINESS  REVIEW  MADE  REASONABLE:
STRUCTURAL  AND  CONCEPTUAL  REFORM
OF THE “HARD LOOK”
Sidney A. Shapiro* & Richard W. Murphy**
ABSTRACT
As Representative John Dingell remarked in the best sentence ever said on the power of
procedure over substance, “I’ll let you write the substance . . . you let me write the procedure, and
I’ll screw you every time.”1  Accordingly, designing procedures for legislative rulemaking, a domi-
nant feature of modern governance, has spawned one of the most contentious debates in all of
administrative law.  Compounding the stakes, over the last fifty years, the courts, with help from
Congress and presidents, have relentlessly made rulemaking procedures more burdensome, imped-
ing efforts to preserve the environment, protect workers, and forestall financial collapse, among
other important agency missions.
Review for “arbitrariness” is the source of most of the burdens that courts have imposed on
agency rulemaking.  Modern doctrine, often called “hard look review,” requires an agency to
have, at the moment it adopts a rule, a justification strong enough to satisfy the demands of
“reasoned decisionmaking.”  As a corollary, an agency can never rely on post hoc justifications to
save a rule.  This requirement of reasoned decisionmaking might itself sound eminently reasona-
ble.  As implemented in rulemaking, however, its demands are highly artificial, force agencies to
waste time and resources on developing impenetrable explanations for their rules, encourage regu-
lated parties to bloat the process, and increase the risk of judicial vacation of reasonable rules.
To correct these problems, courts should allow agencies to defend their rules based on post
hoc justifications—so long as they are based on information exposed to public scrutiny during
the rulemaking process itself.  This proposal may sound like administrative law heresy, but it has
surprisingly strong roots both in historical and current practice.  Adopting it would enhance
agency effectiveness without undermining other important values, notably including accounta-
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1 Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
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bility, fairness, and accuracy, served by current doctrine.  The proposal also highlights a better,
more flexible conception of “arbitrariness” review.  As they discharge this ambiguous task, courts
have an ongoing duty to recognize and balance the various competing values served by both
rulemaking and its judicial review.  Courts should abandon their current rigid orthodoxy and
adopt the proposal because, in short, it strikes a better balance among these values.
“Explain all that,” said the Mock Turtle.
“No, no!  The adventures first,” said the Gryphon in an impatient tone: “explana-
tions take such a dreadful time.”2
INTRODUCTION
Just last year, in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, the Supreme Court
reiterated the forty-year-old Vermont Yankee principle, insisting that courts
have no authority to impose rulemaking procedures on agencies to serve
judicial “notion[s] of which procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further
some vague, undefined public good.”3  Given the central role of agency
rulemaking in modern American governance, the importance of this stance
is hard to exaggerate.  In terms of sheer quantity, the Code of Federal Regu-
lations is far longer than the United States Code.4  Many agency rules, such
as the Obama Administration’s recently promulgated Clean Power Plan,
determine critical policies with massive national or even global impacts.5
The power to write procedures for these rules carries with it a great deal of
power to impact substance because, as Representative John Dingell remarked
in the best sentence ever said on this subject, “I’ll let you write the sub-
stance . . . you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw you every time.”6
Considered in this light, the Court’s categorical refusal to allow judicial
usurpation of control over rulemaking procedures has a noble, even majestic,
air.  It is also pretty hilarious, proving that the Justices are masters of that
obscure and underappreciated art: administrative law comedy.  In point of
well-known fact, the courts, led by the D.C. Circuit in the late 1960s and
1970s, essentially rewrote the statutory procedures for notice-and-comment
rulemaking, which is the default method for promulgating legislative rules
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7  Thanks to this judicial
transformation, the marvelously simple and speedy rulemaking procedures
of 1946, when the APA was adopted, bear about as much resemblance to the
2 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS 89 (Modern Library Paperback ed. 2002) (1865).
3 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015) (quoting Vt. Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978)).
4 See Tom Cummins, Code Words, 5 J.L. 89, 98 (2015) (documenting that, as of 2012,
the Code of Federal Regulations was over three times the length of the United States
Code).
5 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Util-
ity Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60) (setting state-by-state targets for reducing carbon emissions).
6 Hearings, supra note 1, at 312 (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
7 For a summary of this judicial transformation, see infra subsections I.B.1–6.
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rulemaking procedures of 2016 as an acorn does to a mighty seventy-year-old
oak.
One of the most important elements of the judicial transformation of
rulemaking involved a radical shift in how courts review agency rules for arbi-
trariness under section 706 of the APA.8  Back in 1946, a plaintiff challenging
a rule on this ground needed to demonstrate to a court that no plausible,
reasonable set of facts could be conceived to support the rule.9  By contrast,
under modern “hard look” review for arbitrariness, an agency must establish
that, at the time it took its action, it had a contemporaneous rationale suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of “reasoned decisionmaking.”10  This
approach imposed on rulemaking the Chenery principle that courts should
determine whether to uphold an agency’s discretionary action based on the
actual reasons that motivated the agency at the time that it acted.11  Applying
this principle, a post hoc rationale, no matter how sensible, should not be
able to save an agency action from condemnation as arbitrary.
In the abstract, nothing could sound more reasonable than for courts to
insist that agencies actually base their actions on good reasons.  As imple-
mented, however, modern arbitrariness review has made the rulemaking pro-
cess unduly onerous and time-consuming, with important rules often taking
many years to complete.12  Once completed, these rules are then subject to
judicial review that can be political and unpredictable,13 making it difficult
for agencies to guess whether an explanation for a rule will be upheld under
hard look review.  This state of affairs is all the more problematic given agen-
cies’ notorious lack of sufficient resources to carry out their assigned statu-
tory missions.
What, if anything, should be done to correct this situation has been
widely debated among administrative law scholars, who have proposed a
range of solutions from the elimination of hard look review to retaining it
pretty much in its present form, with most proposals focusing on modulating
8 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (instructing courts to vacate agency actions determined
to be “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion”).
9 Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185–86 (1935).
10 E.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983) (approving hard look style review of legislative rules).
11 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (declaring that “an administrative
order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its
powers were those upon which its action can be sustained”).  For discussion of the courts’
imposition of Chenery’s contemporaneous rationale principle on notice-and-comment
rulemaking during the 1970s, see infra subsection I.B.5.
12 For discussion of the problem of rulemaking “ossification” (i.e., that rulemaking has
become unduly slow and costly due to accumulating procedural requirements), see infra
subsection I.C.4.  For discussion of manipulation of the rulemaking process by special
interests, see generally Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion
in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671 (2012).
13 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Politicized Judicial Review in Administrative
Law: Three Improbable Responses, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 323–31 (2012) (summarizing
studies on the ideological nature of judicial review of agency action).
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the strictness of judicial review for rationality—e.g., making “hard looks” into
something softer.14  Notwithstanding all this criticism, hard look review has
been extremely stable since the Supreme Court gave its stamp of approval
over thirty years ago in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.15
This lack of success suggests that a different and more structural
approach is appropriate.  In this spirit, this Article proposes a simple reform
that may, on first hearing, sound heretical but that proves to have surpris-
ingly strong roots in both the history of administrative law and current judi-
cial practice.  Specifically, courts should relax their bar on post hoc
rationales, allowing agencies to rely upon them so long as they are based on
information exposed to outside scrutiny during the notice-and-comment pro-
cess.16  Adopting this proposal would correct distortions in the rulemaking
process that make agencies’ task of defending their rules needlessly costly
and difficult.  Most notably, it would reduce the incentive that the current
system creates for agencies to pour excessive time and energy into develop-
ing exhaustive, impenetrable explanations for rules sufficient to answer any
question that a generalist (and perhaps ill-disposed) judge might deem mate-
rial years later.17  It would also curb the incentives of special interests to bloat
the rulemaking process with excessive comments and to seek judicial review
on relatively trivial grounds.18  In addition, adopting the proposal would
decrease the danger of courts vacating rules that further agency statutory
missions, based on readily curable defects in official explanations.
Still, a practically-minded reader might well wonder: Why might anyone
think that the courts would consider abandoning application of the contem-
poraneous rationale principle, a core doctrine of modern administrative law,
to notice-and-comment rulemaking?  This very good question happens to
have a very interesting answer: courts, although they do not seem quite ready
to admit it, already ignore the contemporaneous rationale principle in a class
of important cases.  The primary evidence of this impulse comes from the
14 See infra Section II.A (discussing “modulation” proposals).
15 463 U.S. at 43.  For the Court’s most recent significant opinion confirming the con-
tours of review for reasoned decisionmaking under State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57, see FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–16 (2009).
16 This Article’s project might be fairly characterized as a full-length elaboration and
defense of an excellent suggestion that Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit made in a 134-word
paragraph almost twenty years ago.  Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera,
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 666 (1997).  For a more recent, concise argument along these lines,
see Note, Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 1924–29
(2009) (contending that courts should relax Chenery’s bar on post hoc rationales because
the purported benefits of saving judicial decision costs, reducing judicial discretion, and
improving the quality of agency rules are outweighed by costs of delaying agency action
due to vacation of rules and strengthening agency status quo bias).
17 See infra subsection I.C.2 (discussing the bloating of the “concise general state-
ments” required by the APA).
18 See infra subsection I.C.3 (discussing the incentives for regulated parties to bloat the
comment process).
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practice of remand without vacation.  Applying this remedy, a court, after
determining that an agency action suffers from a defective explanation, does
not throw it out but instead leaves the action in effect while the agency takes
post hoc steps to correct it.19  Our proposal thus seeks to encourage courts to
follow, in a more open and systematic way, an impulse that they already dis-
play—if one knows where to look.
Our proposal recognizes and builds on the fact that Congress’s com-
mand to courts to set aside “arbitrary” agency actions is fundamentally ambig-
uous.  To implement this command responsibly, courts must identify and
balance the various legitimate and competing interests that rulemaking and
its judicial review should serve.  When they reformed notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures, the courts advanced legitimate administrative law
values, including accountability, accuracy, and fairness, but with a loss of
agency effectiveness and efficiency, which are also administrative law values
of the first rank.  The courts can restore some of this lost effectiveness and
efficiency by adopting our proposal to relax the Chenery ban on post hoc
justifications—and they can do so without significantly undermining other
important values served by modern arbitrariness review.
To assess properly this Article’s proposal for reforming the structure of
modern arbitrariness review, one must understand in some detail the nature
of the current system as well as how courts created it through aggressive con-
struction of the APA to serve various policy interests.  Part I therefore
recounts the judicial transformation of notice-and-comment rulemaking
from its simple past to its complex present.  Part II will summarize previous
proposals to reform modern arbitrariness review and comment on their gen-
erally unhappy fate.  Part III seeks to legitimize the heresy of allowing agen-
cies to rely on post hoc rationales to support their rules by emphasizing the
deep roots of this practice in older administrative law as well as its consistency
with the modern practice of remand without vacation.  This Part then elabo-
rates on the proposal’s advantages and defuses notable objections.  And then,
consistent with custom, the Article concludes.
I. REFORMING RULEMAKING: CHANGES AND CONSEQUENCES
Courts transformed notice-and-comment rulemaking to serve values
such as accountability, fairness, and accuracy.  These values are, beyond ques-
tion, good things, but one can have, as they say, too much of a good thing.
19 See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (establishing a framework for determining whether to apply remand with-
out vacation to an inadequately supported rule).  For the leading academic article on
remand without vacation, see generally Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies
and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003) (justifying remand
without vacation as an exercise of equitable judicial discretion to leave legally defective
actions temporarily in force).  For further discussion of this remedy, including a novel
justification of its legality, see infra Section III.B.
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Another important value of administrative law is agency effectiveness.20  After
all, if courts impose procedures that unduly impede an agency from accom-
plishing its regulatory mission, then those procedures, by hypothesis, become
instruments for blocking rather than effecting the legislative will.  As we
develop below, the courts’ transformation of rulemaking has undermined
agency effectiveness in significant and unnecessary ways, necessitating a
rebalancing of administrative law values.
A. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Was So Easy When the APA Was Young
The passage of the APA in 1946 was the culmination of a long contest
between New Dealers and business and conservative interests.21  The latter
sought to limit and control administrative action by requiring extensive pro-
cedures; the New Dealers, concerned with ensuring effective government
action,22 sought to preserve agency flexibility.  The APA resolved this clash,
after a fashion, by saying “yes” to both sides, establishing templates for what
are commonly called “formal” and “informal” actions by agencies.  Formal
actions involve extensive, trial-type procedures based on a well-defined, judi-
cial-style record.23  Informal actions form a vast residual category not subject
to these requirements.24  The APA did not attempt to categorize by one
heroic statutory effort those agency actions that would be formal and those
that would be informal.  Instead, the APA contemplates that Congress will
specify in an agency’s enabling act whether it should use formal or informal
procedures for either rulemaking or adjudication.25
The APA’s default mechanism for informal rulemaking is the notice-
and-comment process.26  Under the APA as written, notice of a proposed
rule can be quite general, amounting to merely a “description of the subjects
and issues involved.”27  The APA instructs agencies to accept comments on
proposed rules, but it does not tell agencies what to do with them other than
20 See Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 258, 279 (1978) (“It is equally important . . . to provide mechanisms that will not delay
or frustrate substantive regulatory programs.”).
21 Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89, 97
(1996).
22 See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) (making the
canonical New Deal case for administrative government).
23 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556–57 (2012) (setting forth requirements for formal adjudica-
tions and rulemakings).
24 See id. § 553 (detailing procedural requirements for informal rulemaking); Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655–56 (1990) (noting that the APA
requires only the “minimal requirements” of 5 U.S.C. § 555 for informal adjudication).
25 See § 553(c) (providing that the formal rulemaking procedures of 5 U.S.C.
§§ 556–57 apply where “rules are required by statute to be made on the record after oppor-
tunity for an agency hearing”); id. § 554(a) (providing that formal adjudication proce-
dures apply “in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing”).
26 Id. § 553.
27 Id. § 553(b)(3).
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to require that rules be based on “the relevant matter presented.”28  Also,
when an agency promulgates its final rule, it must offer a “concise general
statement of [its] basis and purpose.”29
These spare requirements did not mark a radical shift from the pre-APA
regime.  It had long been the practice of many agencies to seek public com-
ment when developing rules.30  The goal of the APA’s drafters in codifying
and generalizing this best practice was to ensure that agencies take an obvi-
ous and relatively easy step to gather information from the public before
adopting regulations with the force of law.31  Most certainly, the goal was not
to impose a sort of adversarial, judicial-like process on rulemaking.
The APA instructs courts to review the factual and policy underpinnings
of informal rules for arbitrariness.32  In 1946, this standard of review was
understood to be extremely deferential.  Just eleven years earlier, in the 1935
case Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, the Supreme Court had described
arbitrariness review as determining whether “any state of facts reasonably can
be conceived that would sustain” a rule.33  Professor Richard Pierce has
observed that “[t]his version of the arbitrary and capricious test demands
virtually nothing of an agency except a lawyer with enough creativity to iden-
tify a plausible justification for a rule based on a plausible pattern of facts.”34
Federal courts reviewing agency rules for arbitrariness continued to apply
this generous approach into the 1960s.35
28 Id. § 553(c).
29 Id.
30 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REP. OF THE ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE
103–05 (1941) [hereinafter FINAL REP.].
31 S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 20 (1946) (noting public comments are “essential [not to the
fairness of a regulation per se, but rather] . . . to permit administrative agencies to inform
themselves”); see also Pac. Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197, 205
(9th Cir. 1965) (“It is apparent that in rule making hearings the purpose is to permit the
agency to educate itself and not to allow interested parties to choose the issues or narrow
the scope of the proceedings.”).
32 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
33 Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935); see also Thompson
v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 69 (1937) (holding that, to rebut the presumption
of facts sufficient to justify the rule, the plaintiff would need to demonstrate that the rule
bore no reasonable relation to legislative purposes motivating delegation); FINAL REP.,
supra note 30, at 116 (explaining that courts conducting review of rules merely assess
whether there is a “rational relation of the regulation to the statute”).
34 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4 (5th ed. 2010).
35 See N.Y. Foreign Freight Forwarders & Brokers Ass’n v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 337 F.2d
289, 296–97 (2d Cir. 1964) (upholding the agency rule as reasonable without referencing
agency rationale); Superior Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 322 F.2d 601, 619 (9th Cir.
1963) (opining that courts must accept the factual premises of general rulemaking); Bige-
low-Sanford Carpet Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 718, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (upholding agency rule
based on what agency “may have decided” that “the public might need to know” and what
the agency “may have thought” the appellant sought to achieve); see also William Funk,
Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 147 (1991) (docu-
menting that many state courts continued to apply Pacific States Box-style review).
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B. The Great Judicial Transformation of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
Until the 1960s, most regulation had been economic (e.g., ratemaking)
and implemented through the case-by-case process of adjudication rather
than through quasi-legislative rulemaking procedures.36  The 1960s and
1970s, however, marked the creation of a raft of new, powerful social regula-
tory agencies, such as the Occupational Health and Safety Administration
(OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Because Con-
gress did not specify formal rulemaking for these agencies, they were able to
take advantage of the relatively modest procedural demands of notice-and-
comment rulemaking to issue regulations furthering their statutory mandates
in relatively short order.  For example, on January 30, 1971, the EPA pub-
lished in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking for the original
primary and secondary air quality standards promulgated under the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970.37  Three months later, the agency published
the final rule, which was accompanied by an explanation that was one page
long (albeit in the Federal Register’s triple columns and small font).38  For
another compelling example, consider that in 1972, OSHA promulgated a
major rule governing asbestos in just six months.39
These two remarkably “speedy” major rules came at the end of an era.
Starting in the late 1960s, courts radically changed notice-and-comment
rulemaking, transforming it into a kind of paper hearing.  The mix of
impulses that led to these changes was complex.  Corporate interests sought
to forestall regulatory burdens.40  Public interest groups sought to control
capture of agencies by regulated interests.41  Courts, presented with the task
of reviewing highly complex, consequential, and technical rules, imposed
familiar adjudicative models on the quasi-legislative process of rulemaking
by, among other moves, limiting ex parte contacts and expanding notice
36 Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of the
Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 482 (2003).
37 National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards, 36 Fed. Reg. 1502
(1971).
38 National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards, 36 Fed. Reg. 8186
(1971); see Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992) (citing this example as evidence for the thesis that notice-and-
comment rulemaking has “[o]ssifi[ed]”).
39 See Elinor P. Schroeder & Sidney A. Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The
Role of Markets, Regulation, and Information, 72 GEO. L.J. 1231, 1305–09 (1984) (listing publi-
cation dates of health standards).
40 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Which Institution Should Determine Whether an Agency’s Expla-
nation of a Tax Decision Is Adequate?: A Response to Steve Johnson, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 9–10
(2014) (describing how regulated firms gamed new procedures by submitting “lengthy and
detailed comments . . . often accompanied by consultants’ reports” to hamper agency
rulemaking efforts).
41 Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039, 1050–52 (1997).
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requirements.42  With a whiff of paradox, courts and commentators justified
this judicialization of rulemaking with an “interest representation model.”43
According to this view, ensuring that outside pressure groups all had seats at
the rulemaking table—and that agencies had to pay sufficient heed to their
arguments and evidence—helped to cure the democracy deficit associated
with legislation by unelected bureaucrats.44
Details concerning the major judicial “amendments” to notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking follow.
1. Pre-Enforcement Review Becomes Generally Available
Before the judicial transformation of rulemaking, review generally took
place in the context of judicial review of an agency enforcement action apply-
ing a rule.45  The enforcement action itself provided additional information
and context for determining the rule’s legality and rationality.  Then, in 1967
in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, the Supreme Court adopted an approach to
reviewability and ripeness that made pre-enforcement review of rules pre-
sumptively available.46  Shifting the dominant model for review of rules to
pre-enforcement challenges naturally encouraged regulated parties to chal-
lenge rules more frequently.  In such pre-enforcement proceedings, a court
cannot, by hypothesis, obtain information from a record created by agency
enforcement proceedings.  This placed great pressure on courts, especially
circuit courts, to find a substitute basis for their decisions.47  As the following
subsections discuss, courts solved this problem by greatly increasing agencies’
obligations under the notice-and-comment process.
2. Notice Obligations Refashioned for an Adversarial Process
Recall that the APA states that notice of a proposed rule may consist of
merely “a description of the subjects and issues involved.”48  This type of
42 See Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 856, 883–900 (2007) (discussing these elements of the judicial transformation of
rulemaking).
43 See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1669 (1975) (describing and critiquing the judicial transformation of
administrative law toward an “interest representation” model).
44 See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 578
(1985) (describing reformed rulemaking “as a means of fostering a substitute political pro-
cess in which all affected interests would be represented and considered”).
45 See Pierce, supra note 40, at 7 (noting the general unavailability of pre-enforcement
review prior to the judicial transformation of rulemaking).
46 Abbot Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–54 (1967) (holding that a legislative rule
promulgated by the FDA constituted “final agency action” presumptively subject to review
under the general terms of the APA, and explaining that the “ripeness” of rules for pre-
enforcement review depends on a two-prong inquiry that examines the “fitness” of the
issues for review and whether the party seeking review would suffer undue “hardship” if the
court withholds pre-enforcement review).
47 See Pierce, supra note 40, at 8 (discussing this dynamic).
48 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3) (2012).
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spare notice may have been sufficient for a system that uses notice and com-
ment as a convenient means to gather some relevant information from inter-
ested outsiders.  It cannot, however, provide an adequate foundation for a
serious adversarial critique of an agency’s information, analysis, methods,
and plans.  As a result, courts have “interpreted” the APA aggressively to
require that a notice of proposed rulemaking reveal all the scientific and
technical data and methodologies underlying the proposal.49  If the agency
decides to rely on significant new information that becomes available after
issuance of the notice, the agency must issue a supplemental notice and pro-
vide an additional comment period.50  The net result of these requirements
is that “[n]otices can easily run tens of tiny-typed pages in the Federal Regis-
ter and incorporate by reference hundreds or thousands of pages of support-
ing documentation.”51
3. Courts Adopt a Closed-Record Model for Review
The APA expressly defines a “record” for formal proceedings as having
the trappings of a trial—e.g., transcript of testimony, exhibits, etc.52  It does
not impose such a requirement on informal proceedings, including notice-
and-comment rulemaking.53  Indeed, the absence of a formal record require-
ment is why such actions are characterized as “informal” in the first place.
Freeing agencies from the constraint of a formal record in rulemaking
enables them to rely on internally available information and expertise when
making a decision, in addition to relying on whatever information might
have been shared as part of the rulemaking process.54
49 See, e.g., United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977)
(explaining that a court cannot ensure an agency action was not “arbitrary” unless the
agency notified interested persons of the scientific research on which it was relying); cf.
Beermann & Lawson, supra note 42, at 892 (observing that “[t]he notion that a modern
agency could issue a notice of proposed rulemaking that simply announces a general sub-
ject and calls for information is unthinkable”).
50 See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (explaining
that an agency must share the “most critical factual information” on which it relies and that
this obligation can trigger a requirement of additional notice and comment). But cf.
Building Ass’n of Superior Cal. v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding
that additional notice and comment was not necessary where an agency relied upon a
study received during the comment period that “did not reject or modify the [agency’s
original] hypothesis”).
51 Beermann & Lawson, supra note 42, at 894.
52 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (defining administrative records for formal proceedings).
53 See generally id. §§ 553, 555 (imposing no “record” requirements for informal
rulemaking or adjudication); see also S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 39 (1946) (indicating that
administrative records, as such, only exist where Congress “has required . . . [a formal]
administrative hearing in which [such an] . . . administrative record may be made”).
54  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATT’Y. GEN.’S MANUAL ON THE APA 31–32 (1947) (noting
that, for informal rulemaking, “an agency is free to formulate rules upon the basis of
materials in its files and the knowledge and experience of the agency, in addition to the
materials adduced in public rule making proceedings”).
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that informal agency actions
are indeed subject to a “record,” which the Court broadly defined as includ-
ing all the relevant material that the decisionmaker actually considered
before taking its action.55  Obviously, this very broad approach can create
difficulties for complex rulemakings, which may take years to conduct and
involve many agency officials.  Several decades after this change, courts, agen-
cies, and commentators still have not worked out settled, uniform practices
for determining the proper contents of records for informal rulemaking.56
It is clear, however, that the record closes upon the signing or publica-
tion of a rule in its final form.57  Once this closure happens, it is generally
too late for the agency to add new information to the record, such as a help-
ful study, to aid in judicial review.58  Supplementation of the record is
strongly disfavored and allowed only in very limited situations, e.g., where
necessary to explain highly technical terms.59  In short, if an agency wants
information to be available for consideration during judicial review, then this
information should be developed, shared, and considered during the
rulemaking process.
4. Concise General Statements Become Ventilators
Recall that the APA requires an agency to publish a “concise general
statement of [ ] basis and purpose” when it adopts a final rule after notice
and comment.60  Before the judicial transformation, such a “concise general
statement” could actually be “concise.”  For example, as noted above, the
concise general statement for EPA’s first rule promulgating air quality stan-
dards under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 was a single page long.61
55 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971). See generally
LELAND E. BECK, AGENCY PRACTICES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS IN
INFORMAL RULEMAKING 10 (2013) (collecting authority).
56 See generally BECK, supra note 55, at 9 (noting, based on agency survey responses,
that “[a]gency practice in the development of administrative records for purposes of judi-
cial review of regulations varies widely”).
57 Id. at 54.
58 As the judicial transformation of rulemaking unfolded, a few courts resisted ignor-
ing post-promulgation evidence bearing on the correctness of an agency’s decision. See
Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 812 (9th Cir. 1980) (“If the studies showed
that the Agency proceeded upon assumptions that were entirely fictional or utterly without
scientific support, then post-decisional data might be utilized by the party challenging the
regulation.”); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 729 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“Rule-mak-
ing is necessarily forward-looking, and by the time judicial review is secured events may
have progressed sufficiently to indicate the truth or falsity of agency predictions.  We do
not think a court need blind itself to such events . . . .”).  For a much later echo of this
approach, see Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S., 85 F. Supp. 3d 387,
402 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Amoco with approval).
59 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930, 943 (9th Cir.
2006) (identifying limited exceptions to the bar on supplementation).
60 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
61 See supra text accompanying note 38 (discussing this example of a one-page concise
general statement supporting an important, complex rule).
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In some cases, courts were satisfied with even less in the way of explanation.
For instance, the D.C. Circuit rejected a procedural attack on a rule for fail-
ure to include a separate concise general statement because (a) Congress
had already specified the purpose by statute; and (b) the terms of the rule
itself made its “source, basis, and purpose” plain enough.62  One can even
find instances of courts characterizing omission of a concise general state-
ment as a “purely technical flaw” that could not justify voiding a rule.63
As judicial review of rules shifted to pre-enforcement proceedings, how-
ever, concise general statements naturally became an object of far greater
attention by courts struggling to understand the bases for agency rules.
Along these lines, in the seminal 1968 case of Automotive Parts & Accessories
Association v. Boyd, the D.C. Circuit admonished agencies
against an overly literal reading of the statutory terms “concise” and “gen-
eral.”  These adjectives must be accommodated to the realities of judicial
scrutiny, which do not contemplate that the court itself will, by a laborious
examination of the record, formulate in the first instance the significant
issues faced by the agency and articulate the rationale of their resolution.
We do not expect the agency to discuss every item of fact or opinion
included in the submissions made to it in informal rule making.  We do
expect that, if the judicial review which Congress has thought it important to
provide is to be meaningful, the “concise general statement of . . . basis and
purpose” . . . will enable us to see what major issues of policy were ventilated
by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it did.64
Building on this “ventilation” theme, courts have frequently declared
that it is arbitrary for an agency to fail to respond in its concise general state-
ment to significant comments raised during notice and comment.65  Agen-
cies naturally therefore try to stuff into concise general statements their
answers to any comments that they fear a reviewing court might deem signifi-
cant months or years later.  While this has created a nice business opportu-
nity for contractors that are hired to undertake this onerous task, it also
means that ventilation has made “concise general statements” extraordinarily
long and specific.66
62 Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 718, 721 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1961); see also
N.Y. Foreign Freight Forwarders & Brokers Ass’n v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 337 F.2d 289, 296
(2d Cir. 1964) (concluding that rules satisfied the concise general statement requirement
by identifying the statute they implemented and stating that they “have for their purpose
the establishment of standards and criteria to be observed and maintained”).
63 Hoving Corp. v. FTC, 290 F.2d 803, 807 (2d Cir. 1961).
64 Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (quoting
5 U.S.C. § 553(c)).
65 See, e.g., Lilliputian Sys., Inc. v. Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., 741
F.3d 1309, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The arbitrary and capricious standard . . . includes a
requirement that the agency . . . respond to ‘relevant’ and ‘significant’ public comments”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (establishing the principle that agencies must respond
to material comments).
66 See infra subsection I.C.2 (discussing the bloating of concise general statements).
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5. Contemporaneous Rationale Principle Imposed on Rulemaking
The requirement that concise general statements demonstrate “ventila-
tion” of all material issues would not have any bite if agencies were able to
supplement them freely after the fact with improved, post hoc explanations
of their actions.  Their ability to do so, however, is sharply limited by applica-
tion of Chenery’s contemporaneous rationale principle to informal rulemak-
ing.  Just as the closed-record approach discussed above generally blocks
agencies from relying on post-promulgation information to defend their rules,
so the Chenery principle generally blocks them from relying on post-promul-
gation rationales.
In 1943, several years before enactment of the APA, the Supreme Court
declared in SEC v. Chenery, “[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld
unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers
were those upon which its action can be sustained.”67  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court often remarks that courts should not rely on post hoc ratio-
nales to uphold an agency’s discretionary action.68  The Chenery Court sup-
ported this principle, for which it offered very little precedential support,
with the somewhat counterintuitive argument that it blocks courts from
usurping agency authority.69  The theory here is that, after learning from a
court that its rationale for an action was legally defective, an agency might
wish, after mature consideration, to take some different action.  A court
therefore does not actually “help out” an agency, as it were, when it supplies
an acceptable, legal rationale for an agency action after the agency’s own
rationale fails.  Rather, the court risks intruding on the agency’s authority to
alter course.70  In addition, the Chenery Court observed that the contempora-
neous rationale principle supports orderly judicial review, enabling parties to
reasonably assess whether to challenge agency actions, and enabling courts to
review challenges based on a well-defined set of arguments.71
Chenery itself arose out of the type of proceeding most obviously suited to
application of its contemporaneous rationale principle.  The case involved
review of what might be characterized in modern terms as a formal adjudica-
tion that resolved a discrete policy issue in an extensive agency opinion.
67 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
68 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (“[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations
for agency action.” (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962))); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971) (describing
post hoc rationalizations as “an inadequate basis for review” (citing Burlington, 371 U.S. at
1689–69; Chenery, 318 U.S. at 87)).
69 Chenery, 318 U.S. at 88, 94–95.
70 See, e.g., Women Involved in Farm Econ. v. USDA., 876 F.2d 994, 998–99 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (“By adopting a specific argument in support of agency action offered by counsel in
the litigating process—but not relied on by the agency—the courts might actually restrict
improperly the agency’s future freedom of action to make policy under a particular
statute.”).
71 Chenery, 318 U.S. at 94–95.
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Under such circumstances, it was plausible to expect the agency to explain its
contemporaneous rationale in findings sufficient to discuss all material
points.  It took several decades for Chenery to expand its reach beyond this
natural domain to informal proceedings.  Of particular note, informal rules
continued to be subject to review under Pacific States Box, which Chenery
never mentioned, much less purported to overrule.72
As pre-enforcement review of rules became the norm, however, courts
began, as we have seen, to place greater focus on the “concise general state-
ments” that the APA requires as part of the notice-and-comment process.  At
about the same time, the Supreme Court announced in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe that Chenery’s contemporaneous rationale principle
applies to informal adjudications.73  This confluence naturally suggested that
courts might extend the Chenery principle still further to judicial review of
rules promulgated through notice and comment by treating concise general
statements as authoritative explanations of agencies’ contemporaneous ratio-
nales.  Writing in 1974, Paul Verkuil, a leading administrative law scholar,
made this connection explicit, observing that the effect of judicial decisions
transforming rulemaking procedures had “been to energize, perhaps uncon-
sciously, the Chenery-type requirements of decisionmaking based on reasons
and supported by facts.”74  He suggested that “overt adoption of the Chenery-
type standards as the basis for rulemaking review” seemed to be on the
horizon.75
As the 1970s progressed, Verkuil’s prediction came true as courts both
extended Chenery to informal rulemaking76 and, moreover, emphasized that
agencies’ contemporaneous rationales should be explained in their concise
general statements.77  The D.C. Circuit’s 1977 decision in Tabor v. Joint Board
72 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (discussing the Pacific States Box
regime for review).
73 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
74 Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 234
(1974).
75 Id.
76 For early lower court opinions stating that Chenery applies to informal rulemaking,
see for example Nat’l Ass’n of Food Chains, Inc. v. ICC, 535 F.2d 1308, 1313–14 (D.C. Cir.
1976); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 (1st Cir. 1974); Portland Cement Ass’n
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973); City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
77 See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
71 (1975) (observing that, as of 1975, “a fairly rigorous approach prevail[ed], under which
the necessary articulation of reasons must appear in the preamble to the promulgated rule
or in some other document of equally formal standing”).  It bears noting that Chenery does
not, by its own terms, demand that agencies give contemporaneous explanations of their
contemporaneous rationales for their actions.  In theory, if a concise general statement
provides an incomplete account of the agency’s contemporaneous rationale, an agency
could offer supplemental evidence to fill in the missing details consistent with Chenery.
The Supreme Court flagged this possibility in Overton Park, observing that, where an
agency fails to offer a contemporaneous explanation for an action, a court can require
affidavits or testimony to allow reconstruction of the agency’s contemporaneous rationale.
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for Enrollment of Actuaries provides an especially nice discussion of these
points.78  The agency had used notice and comment to promulgate a rule
governing qualifications for actuaries.  Contrary to the requirements of sec-
tion 553, the agency did not issue a concise general statement explaining the
rule on its publication.  During judicial review, the agency attempted to fill
this gap by attaching an unpublished “statement of reasons” to its motion to
dismiss.  The agency contended that the court could consider this explana-
tion because Chenery did not apply to informal rulemaking.79  This argument,
however, came five to ten years too late, and the court responded with a
series of reasons both for applying the contemporaneous rationale principle
to informal rulemaking and for insisting that this rationale generally appear
in the concise general statement.  First, if Chenery were inapplicable, then
agencies would have no practical reason to comply with their statutory obliga-
tion to explain their rules in concise general statements, and “regulations
would be affirmed whenever the reviewing court could divine a reasonable
explanation for their adoption.”80  Second, Chenery’s underlying rationale,
that it protects agencies from judicial usurpation of their authority, applies
with just as much force to informal rulemaking as to informal adjudication.81
Absent Chenery, a court might affirm a regulation on grounds that the agency
itself, given proper time and procedures for reflection, would reject.  Third,
as established in Automotive Parts, a concise general statement should enable
a reviewing court “to see what major issues of policy were ventilated by the
informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it did.”82  Post
hoc affidavits are not an acceptable substitute.83
Seven years later, in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the Supreme Court confirmed with essen-
tially no discussion that the Chenery contemporaneous rationale principle
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419–21.  Two years later, the Court emphasized in Camp v. Pitts
that this sort of intrusion into agency operations is disfavored and should be used only
where “there was such failure to explain administrative action as to frustrate effective judi-
cial review.”  411 U.S. 138, 142–43 (1973).  Lower courts occasionally allow agencies to
submit supplemental evidence regarding their contemporaneous rationales through post
hoc affidavits, but these courts insist that such evidence should merely explain “the original
record and should contain no new rationalizations.”  Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Leavitt, 470
F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (1981)).  The
upshot of these limitations is that a wise agency promulgating a rule through notice and
comment will definitely not exclude bits of its contemporaneous rationale from its contem-
poraneous explanation with the thought that it might be able to dodge Chenery by supple-
menting the latter with evidence of the former.
78 Tabor v. Joint Bd. for Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
79 Id. at 710.
80 Id. This, of course, was precisely the law that prevailed during the era of Pacific
States Box. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (discussing this standard and its
application through the 1960s).
81 Tabor, 566 F.2d at 710.
82 Id. (quoting Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (1968)).
83 Id. at 711 (citing Rodway v. USDA., 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
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applies to informal rulemakings—apparently regarding this conclusion as
obviously true.84
6. Judicial Review Takes on a Hard Look
The preceding changes relating to pre-enforcement review, notice,
closed records, concise general statements, and the contemporaneous ratio-
nale principle were bound up with a major change in judicial attitudes—or at
least judicial rhetoric—regarding the proper intensity of arbitrariness review.
This judicial task came to involve “hard looks.”  At first, agencies were sup-
posed to take these hard looks; later, the hard looks became the courts’ job.
In either event, it has been commonly understood that this form of review “is
generally quite rigorous and imposes a substantial burden on both agencies
and courts.”85
The idea of “hard look” review has roots in Judge Harold Leventhal’s
influential dicta in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC.86  In this founda-
tional case, Judge Leventhal, using rhetoric that would have shocked judges
and lawyers before the twentieth century, characterized courts and agencies
as “collaborative instrumentalities of justice” that work together in a “‘part-
nership’ in furtherance of the public interest.”87  In reviewing an agency’s
discretionary decision, the court’s task is to ensure that the agency gave “rea-
soned consideration to all the material facts and issues.”88  This task requires
insistence that an agency “articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for
decision, and identify the significance of the crucial facts.”89  A court should
intervene where, based on its review of these materials, it “becomes aware . . .
that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems” and
thus has failed its duty to engage in “reasoned decision-making.”90
Although Judge Leventhal conceived of hard look review as requiring
courts to check whether agencies have taken “hard looks,” it rather quickly
became associated with the idea that courts should take “hard looks” at
84 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
50 (1983).
85 Beermann & Lawson, supra note 42, at 880–81.  For a revisionist view on this issue,
see Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH L. REV. 1355
(2016).  Based largely on affirmance rates, Professors Gersen and Vermuele contend that
the notion that courts have imposed a strict, “hard look” form of substantive review on
agencies is essentially a myth, especially at the Supreme Court, where agencies almost
always win on the arbitrariness issue. Id. at 1356–60.  They concede, however, that lower
court decisions present a more “mixed” picture and that selection effects at least compli-
cate analysis. Id. at 1364, 1367.
86 Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851–52 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(emphasis supplied by Judge Leventhal).
87 Id. (first citing Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 160 n.24 (D.C.
Cir. (1967); then quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941)).
88 Id. at 851.
89 Id.
90 Id. (citation omitted).
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agency explanations.91  Writing in 1980, Judge Wald, another leading light of
the D.C. Circuit, explained that, as the judicial transformation of informal
rulemaking took hold, agencies had to offer far more detailed notices and
explanations for their rules, which meant that courts had a much richer set
of “record” materials to review.  As a result, the duty to take a “‘hard look’ . . .
began to appear more judicial than administrative, blurring the original
meaning of that phrase.”92
The Supreme Court confirmed that hard look review for reasoned deci-
sionmaking applies to rules promulgated via notice and comment in 1983 in
Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co.93  The rule at issue rescinded a forthcoming regulatory requirement
that automotive manufacturers install passive restraints in new motor vehi-
cles—a requirement that manufacturers could satisfy by installing either pas-
sive safety belts or airbags.94  After a change in administration, the agency
rescinded the rule because it had become clear that most manufacturers
would comply by installing passive safety belts, which consumers might
detach, leading the agency to conclude that it could not predict that the rule
would generate sufficient safety benefits to justify its costs.  In language that
has become canonical, the Court explained:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explana-
tion for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or
is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.95
Applying this standard, all nine Justices agreed that the agency had arbi-
trarily failed to consider the obvious solution of fixing the rule by amending
it to require airbags, which agency records indicated would save about 10,000
lives per year.96
More importantly for the present purpose, however, five Justices con-
cluded that the rescission was arbitrary on the additional ground that the
agency did not consider the potential effect of “inertia” on use of detachable
safety belts—i.e., the agency did not discuss the problem that usage rates
might be higher than otherwise expected because some people, once
strapped in by an automatic safety belt, might find it too much bother to
91 See Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451–52 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing
how the task of taking “hard looks” rapidly shifted from agencies to courts).
92 Id.
93 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).  Notably, the Supreme Court relied solely on precedents governing review of
adjudications to support application of hard look style review to informal rulemaking.  Id.
94 Id. at 34.
95 Id. at 43.
96 Id. at 46 (“The first and most obvious reason for finding the rescission arbitrary and
capricious is that NHTSA apparently gave no consideration whatever to modifying the
Standard to require that airbag technology be utilized.”).
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press a button to detach it.97  Dissenting on this point, four Justices rejected
the inertia objection as too thin to justify condemning the rule as arbitrary,
concluding that, although the agency’s explanation on this point was “by no
means a model,” it did establish a rational connection between the facts
found and decision reached.98  Together, these two clashing opinions con-
firm the obvious point that reasonable minds often differ about what
amounts to “reasoned decisionmaking.”99
7. Congress and Presidents Pile On
Although courts played the leading role in transforming notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking, no portrait of its relentless evolution toward complexity
could be remotely complete without adverting to the roles that the political
branches have eagerly played.  In the 1980s, critics of regulation emphasized
concerns that agency regulation was irrational because it failed cost-benefit
analysis or because agencies failed to consider significant impacts of their
rules on small businesses or other favored entities.100  These claims begat
what Deborah Stone has aptly named the “rationality project” to reform regu-
lation through “the nexus of rational choice theory, microeconomic effi-
ciency models, and cost-benefit analysis.”101  The goal, in other words, was
for agencies to achieve a “comprehensive analytical rationality,” carefully
examining all conceivable aspects of a rule before it was adopted.102
The rationality project helped produce a series of statutes and executive
orders that have imposed additional analytical requirements on the rulemak-
ing process.  For instance, the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to
consider the impact of proposed rules on “small entities” (e.g., small busi-
nesses).103  The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act requires regulatory impact
analysis for proposed rules likely to cause private or public entities, other
than the federal government, to spend more than $100 million per year
97 Id. at 54.
98 Id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
99 Id. at 52.
100 See Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith
in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 697–703 (2000) (describing and docu-
menting these criticisms).  For rebuttals of these claims, see generally Lisa Heinzerling,
Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate Over Regulatory Reform, 13
RISK 151 (2002); Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345
(2003).
101 Deborah A. Stone, Clinical Authority in the Construction of Citizenship, in PUBLIC POLICY
FOR DEMOCRACY 45, 46 (Helen Ingram & Stephen Rathgeb Smith eds., 1993).
102 See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 10–13 (1991).
103 Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164, 1164 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–12
(2012)); see also Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-121, 110 Stat. 847, 857 (1996) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 601).  For more on
this, see generally JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 133–39
(5th ed. 2012) (discussing the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act).
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(adjusted for inflation).104  Most notably of all, every president since Reagan
has used executive orders to require agencies to conduct formal cost-benefit
analyses of significant proposed and final rules.105  These analyses are subject
to an internal executive review process administered by a super-agency, the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which is housed in the
White House.106
C. Unfortunate Consequences of the Transformation of Notice and Comment
It is not difficult to identify worthwhile goals served by the judicial trans-
formation of notice-and-comment rulemaking outlined above.  Expanded
notice requirements give interested persons a better opportunity to submit
responsive, informed comments regarding proposed rules.  One might rea-
sonably think that expanded notice thus both enhances the “fairness” of the
rulemaking process and improves the ultimate quality of agency analysis.
Developing exhaustive “concise general statements” to explain their rules
requires agencies to be thorough, which may also improve accuracy.  Thor-
ough explanations also demonstrate responsiveness to commenters, which
arguably enhances accountability, fairness, and thus legitimacy.  Imposing
the contemporaneous rationale principle on a closed rulemaking record
enables courts to review agency action using a familiar appellate model that
is, at least from the courts’ point of view, efficient.  It also avoids the problem
of parties sandbagging each other with post-promulgation evidence and
arguments that could have been raised earlier, thus enhancing fairness, effi-
ciency, and perhaps accuracy.  Various attractions of the modern system are,
in short, obvious.
104 Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2012)).  For
other statutes bearing on rulemaking, see for example Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–20 (2012)) (estab-
lishing a clearance procedure for rules that collect information); Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153–54 (2000)
(requiring issuance of guidelines governing the quality of information disseminated by
agencies).
105 See Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 238–68 (2012) (discussing evolution of executive orders
controlling agency action through cost-benefit analysis).
106 The basic architecture for these cost-benefit analysis requirements continues to be
provided by an executive order issued by President Clinton.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. §§ 638, 649 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 126–29 (2006 &
Supp. V 2011); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 131–32 (supplementing Exec. Order No. 12,866).  For additional executive
orders imposing requirements on rulemaking, see for example Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3
C.F.R. § 153, 206–11 (2000) (requiring consideration of federalism); Exec. Order No.
12,988, 3 C.F.R. § 157 (1997) (requiring consideration of impacts on civil justice and litiga-
tion); Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995) (requiring identification of rules that
should be revised in the interests of environmental justice); Exec. Order No. 12,875, 3
C.F.R. § 669 (1994) (requiring consultation with state, local, and tribal governments);
Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Mar. 15, 1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1988) (requiring consideration of impact of rules on property rights).
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We submit, however, that these benefits come at needless cost to other
values, most notably agency effectiveness, which should also be served by
agency rulemaking procedures and their judicial review.  Some of the more
notable costs include the following.
1. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking as Show (Quasi) Trial
Somewhat perversely, expanded notice requirements constrict the
degree to which agencies can actually respond to comments.  The underlying
problem is that, where a final rule differs too much from the proposed rule,
the proposed rule could not have provided outsiders with an adequate basis
for submitting informed comments for “ventilating” the final rule.  In
response to this problem, courts require that an agency’s final rule be a “logi-
cal outgrowth” of the proposed rule.107  As a result, agencies are reluctant to
change a rule in response to comments lest a change render the original
notice inadequate and trigger the requirement of another round of notice
and comment.108  On the other hand, if the agency does not change the
rule, its rule may prove arbitrary because the agency cannot justify it in light
of the comments it received.  Either prong of this Hobson’s choice impedes
agency effectiveness.
To avoid this quandary, agencies try to ensure that notice and comment
will not reveal information that requires them to make significant changes to
their proposed rules before finalizing them.  This in turn requires agencies
to determine facts and make their genuine policymaking decisions before they
ever issue a notice of proposed rulemaking or begin notice and comment.109
Expanded notice requirements intended to improve and shed sunlight on a
public process of policymaking thus actually tend to shove it back into the
shadows.
2. Terrifically Long and Impenetrable “Concise General Statements”
Recall that the D.C. Circuit has warned agencies preparing “concise gen-
eral statement[s]” that judicial expectations for this rulemaking requirement
are not consistent with “an overly literal reading of the statutory terms ‘con-
cise’ and ‘general.’”110  This is a marvelous understatement in light of the
107 Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985); see
also Beermann & Lawson, supra note 42, at 895–99 (discussing the growth of the “logical
outgrowth” principle).
108 Cf. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 42, at 899 (observing that the “logical out-
growth” doctrine “forc[es] agencies to grapple with just how much change is allowed
before a court will declare that the final rule is a material alteration and no longer a logical
outgrowth of the proposal”).
109 See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1367 (2010) (observing that courts’ insistence that rules appear in “essen-
tially final form at the proposed rule stage” has the effect of “inadvertently encourag[ing]
agencies to work with affected parties in the shadows [before notice is issued] rather than
in the sunlight as anticipated by the APA”).
110 Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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incredibly long, impenetrable statements of basis and purpose that emerge
from complex and controversial rulemakings.  It is common to find concise
general statements in the Federal Register that have “metastasize[d] into . . .
book-length treatises.”111  Agencies’ concise general statements are often
hundreds of pages long and filled with technical arcana—impenetrable to all
but insiders.112
These explanations are not, of course, designed for anyone actually to
read in order to understand the basic approach and concerns of a rule.
Rather, they are massive lines of defense that agencies construct to protect
their rules from judicial challenges—often from well-heeled corporate inter-
ests.  Of course, constructing these lines of defense is not easy—as Professor
Pierce observes, “It takes the agency staff or its consultants a long time to
draft the 200–1000-page statement of basis and purpose that a court may, or
may not, consider an adequate response to the 10,000–1,000,000 pages of
comments.”113  And like the Maginot Line, these explanations, despite their
length, can fail as a line of defense.114
3. Bloated Comments
On a very closely related point, the expanded duty that courts have
imposed on agencies to respond to material comments in their concise gen-
eral statements gives outsiders an incentive to manipulate the process to
make the agency’s job even more difficult.  Professor Wendy Wagner
describes the resultant dynamic as fostering both information excess and fil-
ter failure.115  Lawyers for regulated parties lard the rulemaking record with
as much information as they can to create the potential for judicial remands
based on an agency’s failure to respond.116  In response, rather than attempt
111 Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson
to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE. L.J. 1568, 1656 (2008); see also Richard W. Parker, The
Empirical Roots of the “Regulatory Reform” Movement: A Critical Appraisal, 58 ADMIN. L. REV.
359, 395 (2006) (describing common experience “wad[ing] through a preambular expla-
nation and a final rule” only to encounter “five or six pages of rule, preceded by fifty or
more Federal Register pages setting forth detailed agency explanations and/or responses
to the most technical and arcane comments”).
112 See Parker, supra note 111, at 397 (discussing the impenetrability of modern “con-
cise general statement[s]”; noting that practical inaccessibility of information to the public
contributes to a democracy deficit).
113 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V? A Response to Beer-
mann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 920 (2007).
114 See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) reports that it spent 21,000 hours on the rule that the Busi-
ness Roundtable decision refused to enforce because the statement of basis and purpose was
inadequate, including responding to 600 comments, at a cost of $2.2 million.  Rachel A.
Benedict, Note, Judicial Review of SEC Rules: Managing the Costs of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 97
MINN. L. REV. 278, 278 (2012).
115 See Wagner, supra note 109, at 1364–65.
116 See id. at 1365 (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1052
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (describing 10,000 page record as “a sump in which the parties have
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to filter this information, agencies engage in “defensive overkill” in justifying
and explaining their rules.117
This type of regulatory combat, or rulemaking as “blood sport,” does not
favor all comers equally.118  The judicial transformation of rulemaking has
created greater opportunities for outsiders to influence agency outcomes.
Exercising this influence, however, takes resources—consultants’ reports cost
money.  It therefore should come as little surprise that those with more
resources have come to dominate participation in rulemaking.119  Available
empirical evidence demonstrates that corporate interests participate at a far
greater rate than public interest groups in rulemaking procedures—both in
terms of the number and volume of rulemaking comments and the number
of meetings with regulatory agencies.120  This imbalance in resources and
attendant participation undermines the effectiveness of modern rulemaking
insofar as it depends on a quasi-adversarial clash of information and views.
After all, as Justice Marshall observed in another context, “mere access to the
courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adver-
sary process.”121
4. Ossification of Rulemaking
Academic critics have long claimed that the judicial transformation of
rulemaking has made this procedure too slow, expensive, and cumber-
some.122  The courts have, to use administrative law’s favored term, “ossified”
deposited a sundry mass of materials that have neither passed through the filter of rules of
evidence nor undergone the refining fire of adversarial presentation”)); see also Pierce,
supra note 40, at 9 (explaining that lawyers for regulated parties rapidly learned to take
advantage of judicially imposed explanatory requirements, submitting “lengthy and
detailed comments that criticized the rule, often accompanied by consultants’ reports”).
117 See, e.g., R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 245, 247 (1992) (“Since agencies do not like losing big court cases, they reacted
defensively [to the courts’ requirements], accumulating more and more information,
responding to all comments, and covering all their bets.”).
118 McGarity, supra note 12, at 1745 (discussing “[i]nfluence [a]symmetries” in modern
rulemaking).
119 See generally Sidney Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Public Participation Without a Public:
The Challenge for Administrative Policymaking, 78 MO. L. REV. 489 (2013) (discussing the
importance of resources in the rulemaking process).
120 See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and
Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 237–38 (2012) (describing studies of indus-
try dominance).
121 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
122 For a few examples from the literature, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST,
THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 9–25 (1990) (discussing abandonment of rulemaking by
the National Highway Traffic & Safety Administration); Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Patholo-
gies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1020–27 (2000)
(blaming judicial review for impeding rulemaking); McGarity, supra note 38, at 1387–436
(surveying evidence and causes of ossification); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossifica-
tion Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493 (2012)
(contending that recent empirical work discounting the ossification thesis is misdirected);
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notice-and-comment rulemaking.  Given how the courts have massively
expanded agencies’ duties of notice and explanation, the ossification critique
is perfectly intuitive.123  It is also child’s play to thumb through the Federal
Register to find lengthy, impenetrable notices and concise general statements
that support this critique.124
The ossification thesis has been subject to two basic types of pushback.
One view stresses the benefits of hard look review, suggesting that they out-
weigh the costs of increased difficulty.  Professor Mark Seidenfeld, for
instance, has turned to psychological literature to support the claim that
hard look review encourages more careful rulemaking by curbing “cognitive
loafing” by agencies.125  Professor Matthew Stephenson has argued that the
very difficulty of hard look review makes it an effective signaling device that
enables expert agencies to communicate the substantive quality of their deci-
sions to non-expert courts—i.e., an agency’s willingness to issue a rule that
satisfies the demands of the hard look demonstrates the strength of its policy
commitment.126
A second critique has been led by Professors Jason and Susan Yackee,
who contend the empirical “evidence that ossification is either a serious or
widespread problem is mixed and relatively weak.”127  Based on a study of
thousands of rules promulgated by the Department of the Interior between
1950 and 1990, they concluded: (a) rules issued during the latter half of this
period did not take significantly longer to promulgate than rules issued dur-
ing the earlier half; and (b) the vast majority of rules were promulgated in
less than two years.128  Thanks to this type of research, a meme seems to have
cf. Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 110
(2015) (discussing the difficulties of empirical analysis of ossification claims; concluding
that “[t]he APA notice-and-comment process may contribute to ossification given that
agency avoidance of that requirement is significantly lower, particularly for rules with
greater litigation risk”).
123 See supra subsections I.B.2, I.B.4, I.C.1–2 (discussing expanded notice and explana-
tion requirements as well as their effects).
124 See supra note 111 (discussing examples of lengthy “concise general statements”).
125 See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 547 (2002) (explaining that hard look review discour-
ages agency staff from “careless or improper reliance” on “habitual decision rules and
other rules of thumb as [cognitive] shortcuts”).
126 See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review,
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 755 (2006) (observing that a “court can reason that the expert
government decisionmaker’s willingness to produce a high-quality explanation signals that
the government believes the benefits of the proposed policy are high”).
127 Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical
Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414,
1421 (2012).
128 Id. at 1456–58; see also Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analy-
sis of EPA Rulemaking from 2001–2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 770–71 (2008) (concluding that
rules issued by EPA between 2001 and 2005 generally were finalized within one-and-one-
half to two years; observing, however, that his study did not examine the amount of time
spent preparing proposed rules for publication or the degree to which procedural require-
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taken root in some quarters that administrative law scholars have greatly
exaggerated the ossification problem.129
The debate over whether ossification exists is, on some level, a reflection
of the fact that rulemaking by federal agencies is a vast and varied enterprise.
As a practical matter, it is very difficult to study in a systematic way.  Worsen-
ing this problem, a great deal of the real work of rulemaking, in part due to
judicial requirements, occurs hidden from public view before the agency
publishes an official notice of proposed rulemaking.130  Empirical studies
that measure the time it takes rules to proceed from published notice to
finalization miss this pre-notice period entirely.  The varied nature of
rulemaking also lends itself to confusion over the precise topic of discussion.
In this vein, Professor Pierce has fairly conceded that proponents of the
ossification thesis should be more precise—it is not directed in general at all
rules; rather, it focuses on complicated rules that implicate “high stakes con-
troversies.”131  It is these major rules that attract outside interests keen to use
all the tools at their disposal to block, slow, or bend regulation.
The ultimate resolution of the ossification debate—or even the meaning
of its terms—is beyond the scope of this Article.  For the present purposes, it
is enough to make two observations that are beyond reasonable controversy:
(a) promulgation of an important, high-stakes rule is a resource-intensive
process that often takes many years of exhaustive work, and (b) agencies are
commonly starved for resources and should not waste them on expensive
rulemaking procedures that do not demonstrably improve either the substan-
tive quality of rules or their perceived legitimacy.
5. Rational Rules at Risk
Given the complex, interconnected, uncertain, and dynamic impacts
that important rules have across society, any agency explanation for an
important rule, no matter how encyclopedic, is likely to be vulnerable to a
charge that it misapprehended or did not discuss some material issues.  The
Supreme Court’s inability or unwillingness to provide a more precise defini-
tion of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation magnifies this problem by
ments encourage avoidance of notice and comment); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political
Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV.
889, 932 (2008) (concluding, based on the actual number of rules agencies produce via
notice and comment, that “[t]he administrative state, at least on a macro level, does not
seem to be substantially ossified”; conceding, however, that such counts cannot resolve the
ossification debate).
129 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 85, at 1369 (referring to agency ossification as
one of the “mini-myths” associated with the “myth of rigorous State Farm review”; citing as
evidence the Yackee, O’Connell, and Johnson studies referenced supra at notes 127–28).
130 See Pierce, supra note 122, at 1495; Raso, supra note 122, at 110; see also supra note
109 and accompanying text (discussing how judicial reforms have shoved real rulemaking
into the shadows of the pre-notice period).
131 Pierce, supra note 122, at 1495.
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inviting judges to vary their approaches to review of rules according to their
own perceptions and inclinations.
This room for maneuver naturally leaves space for the courts’ political
attitudes to infect arbitrariness review in ideologically charged cases.132
Decades ago, responding to concerns over “agency capture” by corporate
forces, public interest groups helped lead the charge for the judicial transfor-
mation of rulemaking.133  The ideological valence of hard look review, how-
ever, depends on the judge deploying it.  Conservative judges, often acting in
the name of comprehensive rationality to block over-regulation, can and do
use the State Farm-style requirement of adequate reasons to curb agency regu-
lation.134  The polycentric nature of agency regulation, which requires agen-
cies to address webs of intertwined issues, ensures that courts taking such
actions, regardless of their ideological stripes, do so without appreciating the
degree to which they are disrupting agency regulatory efforts.135
II. PROPOSALS TO REFORM HARD LOOKS
Academics have been criticizing the judicial reformation of arbitrariness
review for decades, and it is fair to say that their reactions have been mixed
but largely negative.  Some scholars, such as Professor Mark Seidenfeld,
guardedly conclude that, for the most part, modern arbitrariness review
strikes a good balance among the competing values that judicial review of
rules should serve.136  Extreme critics, such as Professor Frank Cross, have
argued for abandoning judicial review of rules for arbitrariness altogether
132 See Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 13, at 323–31 (summarizing studies on ideologi-
cal judicial review of agency action).
133 See Merrill, supra note 41, at 1065–66 (discussing the influence of capture theory at
the D.C. Circuit).
134 See RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO
PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND THREATS TO HEALTH,
SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 165 (2010) (discussing how judges since 1980 have used the
adequate reasons requirement to retard, rather than promote, regulation); Cass R. Sun-
stein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 434–40,
446–52 (2015) (criticizing judges on the D.C. Circuit who “overreached” in applying their
libertarian version of arbitrariness review to rules promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission).
135 See Cross, supra note 122, at 1029.
136 See Seidenfeld, supra note 125; Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethink-
ing Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV.
483 (1997) (defending hard-look review but also suggesting operational changes to help
“deossify” rulemaking) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification].  For recent dis-
cussions of the benefits of the hard look, see Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, The
Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733,
738, 778–84 (2011) (contending that this approach enables generalist judges to serve as
translators of science for “Congress, the public, the media, and interest groups”); Kathe-
rine A. Trisolini, Decisions, Disasters, and Deference: Rethinking Agency Expertise After Fukushima,
33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 327 (2015) (contending that aggressive judicial review of
decisions by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is needed to protect against a large-scale
catastrophe).
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both because it requires courts to make political decisions and because it is a
primary cause of ossification.137  Professor Richard Pierce, another leading
skeptic, has argued that this type of review should be shifted to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in the executive branch, which is better
suited than the courts for this function both in terms of political accountabil-
ity and expertise.138
Most prescriptions for reform of the reformation, however, have been
less structurally ambitious.  Many scholars, including the authors of this Arti-
cle, have focused on reducing the intensity of the “hard looks” with which
courts purportedly examine agency rationales.  After briefly surveying many
of these modulation proposals, this Part will examine reasons for their lack of
actual or potential success.  Encouraging courts to strike the right attitude or
“mood” when they review agency action is an entirely appropriate thing for
law professors and other interested observers to do, and it might, if success-
ful, do some good.139  Greater benefits, however, can be obtained by
reforming the structure of modern arbitrariness review, and Part III will dis-
cuss and defend a proposal for doing so.
A. Modulating the Hard Look
1. Soften the Look
One broad group of proposals seeks to improve judicial review for arbi-
trariness by weakening its intensity across the board.  For instance, a judge
reviewing a rule might act like a “‘pass-fail prof’ who must determine
whether a research paper . . . meets the minimum standards for passable
work” on a subject with which the professor is only vaguely familiar.140  The
agency (student) would receive an “F” and be ordered to try again only if
there were “an inexcusable gap in the analysis, an obvious misquote, or evi-
dence of intellectual dishonesty.”141
Other scholars have expressed concern that some form of heightened
scrutiny, though not as strict as hard look review, may be necessary to ensure
the rationality of agency decisions.142  Along these lines, courts might treat
137 See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1243, 1333–34 (1999); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative
Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 185, 200 (1996) (recommending statutory reform to eliminate
judicial review for arbitrariness).
138 See Pierce, supra note 40, at 13–16 (discussing OIRA’s institutional advantages over
courts for conducting review of reasoned decisionmaking); see also supra subsection I.B.7
(discussing OIRA’s role in centralized White House review of agency rulemaking).
139 Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (explaining that
Congress in the APA legislated a “mood” regarding how courts should review agency action
and that this “mood must be respected”).
140 McGarity, supra note 38, at 1453.
141 Id.
142 See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch:
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J.
387, 425–40 (contending “hard look” review should be understood as a separation of pow-
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arbitrariness review as equivalent to the “rational basis with a bite” standard
that they use to determine the constitutionality of certain types of legislation,
such as content-neutral restrictions on speech.143
An alternative approach seeks to improve modern arbitrariness review by
returning to its pure source, the work of Judge Harold Leventhal.144  Recall
that Judge Leventhal originally characterized the court’s proper function as
checking whether the agency had taken a “hard look” at the pertinent regula-
tory issues.145  As the hard look doctrine evolved, it quickly became associ-
ated with the idea that courts should take “hard looks” at agency
explanations.146  According to proponents, returning to the original
Leventhal formulation would help relax the scrutiny that cloistered, general-
ist judges inappropriately apply when they direct their “hard looks” at rules
produced after years of collective effort by expert agencies.147  Arbitrariness
review might shift away from reviewing the substance of agency judgments
and toward ensuring that agencies follow a “rigorous, analytical, staged deci-
sion-making process.”148
ers principle that preserves rule of law values reflected in the Constitution); Sidney A.
Shapiro, Substantive Reform, Judicial Review, and Agency Resources: OSHA as a Case Study, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 645, 654–55 (1997) (contending that judicial review stricter than minimal
rationality is necessary to promote agency fidelity to statutory mandates).
143 Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV.
419, 425, 460 (2009); see also Heath A. Brooks, American Trucking Associations v. EPA: The
D.C. Circuit’s Missed Opportunity to Unambiguously Discard the Hard Look Doctrine, 27 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 259, 273 (2003) (arguing for an intermediate level of review under which
courts would affirm agency decisions “supported by at least a modicum of evidence or
indirectly buttressed by rational inferences from the best available evidence, so long as
opponents offer no affirmative evidence that clearly refutes the agency’s support”).
144 See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The
Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2015) (proposing that
courts return to the original approach to “hard look” review that Judge Leventhal pro-
posed over forty years ago).
145 See Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(explaining that a rule is arbitrary where an “agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at
the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making” (foot-
note omitted)).
146 See Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451–52 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wald, J.)
(discussing reallocation of the task of taking hard looks from agencies to courts).
147 See Shapiro, supra note 144, at 1144–46; see also Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review
of Administrative Policymaking, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 394 (2002) (contending that the
Leventhal formulation of hard look review “serve[ed] as an instructive expression for the
special judicial restraint in analyzing administrative policy decisions”).
148 Elizabeth Fisher, Pasky Pascual & Wendy Wagner, Rethinking Judicial Review of Expert
Agencies, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1717 (2015) (describing how this dynamic already exists in
connection with judicial review of certain EPA rules).  Associating Judge Leventhal’s work
with a more process-oriented texture for arbitrariness review carries a certain amount of
irony.  In the famous debate during the 1970s between him and Judge Bazelon over the
correct role of arbitrariness review, Judge Leventhal insisted that courts should conduct
properly limited review of the substance of agency decisions, even if they are highly techni-
cal. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., con-
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2. Clarify the Look
Another type of proposal seeks not so much to soften the hard look as to
clarify its demands.  The underlying theory is that the more ambiguous the
language describing the scope of review, the more freedom a judge has to
follow her ideology in applying it.149  To reduce this space for ideological
maneuver, Professors Shapiro and Levy proposed that Congress limit arbi-
trariness review to application of the four criteria that the Court listed in its
canonical State Farm decision.150  Thus, a rule would be arbitrary only
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.151
3. Adjust the Look to Fit Context
A third group of proposals seeks to improve arbitrariness review by vary-
ing its scrutiny according to context.  Some would treat greater political
accountability as a substitute for aggressive judicial review.  For example,
before she joined the Supreme Court, Justice Kagan suggested that judges
might apply more deferential review where the president has taken a public
and active role in shaping a rule, thus accepting responsibility for it.152
Others look more directly to the public for additional accountability and
legitimacy.  Rules produced after robust participation by varied interests
could be treated as presumptively valid, whereas rules produced after pro-
ceedings dominated by narrow economic or political interests could be sub-
ject to stricter review.153  Judges might reward agencies with relaxed review
curring).  Judge Bazelon, by contrast, contended that generalist judges should focus on
whether an agency has followed sound decisionmaking processes when reviewing matters
involving “great technological complexity.” Id. at 66 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (quoting
Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring)).
149 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Sub-
stantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1052 (1995) (arguing that inde-
terminacy in the scope of review encourages aggressive, ideologically-tinged judicial
review).
150 Id. at 1074. But see Thomas O. McGarity, On Making Judges Do the Right Thing, 44
DUKE L.J. 1104, 1108–09 (1995) (contending codification of the State Farm factors would
not actually narrow effective judicial discretion).
151 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
152 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2380 (2001).
153 See Wagner, supra note 109, at 1407–08 (proposing application of “[s]oft [g]lance”
review where a “diverse and balanced group of affected parties” participated in a rulemak-
ing; application of “clear error” review to challenges brought by parties that dominated
rulemaking proceedings, and application of “hard look” review where the challenger “was
unable to engage in the rulemaking process because it lacked sufficient resources or spe-
cialized knowledge, but its members took a great interest in the consequences of the rule”
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where they take creative steps to ensure public representation, such as
employing administrative juries—large panels of randomly selected citi-
zens—to inform policy decisions.154
Other scholars have proposed allowing an agency to earn greater defer-
ence by committing to ongoing review of a rule’s efficacy.  On this approach,
“minimum rational basis review” would apply where an agency establishes
that its rule will cause no irreparable injury and the agency promises to
gather additional information concerning the rule’s effects for continuing
reappraisal.155
Yet another approach involves looking for danger signals that an issue is
important enough to merit a hard look.  Courts might reserve aggressive
review for issues that seem especially significant because: (a) an outsider has
invested substantial resources in raising the issue through the comment pro-
cess; (b) the agency’s own explanation for the rule indicates that the issue is
important; or (c) the issue directly implicates “relevant factors” that Congress
has emphasized in the agency’s enabling act.156  Such an approach would
enable agencies to allocate their limited resources during rulemaking with a
clearer sense of which issues a reviewing court might regard as significant
during judicial review.
B. The Limited Prospects of Modulation Strategies
We are broadly sympathetic with the proposals sketched above to modu-
late the intensity of arbitrariness review of agency rules—indeed, had we suf-
ficient magical powers, there are several that we would require the courts to
adopt.157  Courts themselves, however, have shown no inclination to do so of
their own accord, and, even if they did, these modulation proposals ulti-
mately have limited potential for altering the operation of rulemaking and its
judicial review.
Judges may find these modulation proposals unattractive for a variety of
reasons.  One threshold problem is that, in theory, the current regime
already calls for a type of rationality review.  Lowering this standard in some
(alteration in original)); see also David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act:
Democracy Index Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 82 (2005) (suggesting that judges
could increase deference where submission of a large number of relevant comments shows
greater public involvement); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory
Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 275 (2016)
(deemphasizing merits-based review where a rulemaking actively involves administrators,
civil servants, and interest groups).
154 See David J. Arkush, Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1458, 1462–63 (2013).
155 See McGarity, supra note 38, at 1459–60; see also Daniel A. Farber, Environmental
Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 806 (1994) (proposing that
courts reduce the intensity of review where an agency commits to monitoring the imple-
mentation of a rule and to making appropriate modifications).
156 Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification, supra note 136, at 516–19.
157 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 144, at 1102 (proposing a return to Judge Leventhal’s
original formulation for “hard looks”).
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or all contexts could therefore be construed as requiring judges to uphold
agency actions that they otherwise would conclude are irrational.  In a
related context, Justice Scalia, while a circuit court judge, observed that arbi-
trariness review could not call for less scrutiny than rationality review under
the substantial evidence test because, if this were so, arbitrariness review
would require judges to uphold irrational agency actions.158  Another prob-
lem of many of these modulation proposals is that they would further compli-
cate a review system that, on its face, already seems far too complex.159  In
addition, there is the realpolitik point that weakening judicial review, were it
to work, would take power away from judges—a result that they might find
unappealing regardless of ideology.
A deeper problem is that scholarship has made it increasingly clear that
the vague phrases the courts use to specify varying standards of review have
less effect than one might expect on how judges actually decide cases.  The
suspicion that this may be so is longstanding.  Forty years ago, Professors Gell-
horn and Robinson acerbically observed that “the rules governing judicial
review have no more substance at the core than a seedless grape.”160  They
characterized debates over the meanings of these rules as “a testament to
lawyers’ awe of words.”161  Decades on, empirical studies, although they do
not prove anything so strong as the “seedless grape” thesis, certainly suggest
that judges do not implement fine-grained distinctions among various inten-
sities of rationality review in a way that measurably affects outcomes.  Summa-
rizing and adding to this empirical work, Professor David Zaring has
observed that, regardless of which ostensible standard of review courts apply,
they affirm agencies about two-thirds of the time.162  To be sure, one might
argue that this consistent affirmance rate reflects selection effects—i.e., an
agency might take a more aggressive stance in litigation where it has the ben-
efit of a lax standard of review, and vice versa.  Still, as the empirical studies
pile up, this “abstract possibility ceases to impress.”163
We do not mean to concede that the doctrinal words that courts use to
limit judicial review are meaningless; nor do we mean to suggest that efforts
to change judicial behavior by changing these words are pointless.  As the
Supreme Court recognized long ago in Universal Camera, standards of review
are to a degree a matter of “mood,” and moods can matter—and not just
because they might affect outcomes.164  Moreover, it is intuitively plausible
158 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.).
159 For a critique of these complexities and a proposal for simplification, see generally
David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135 (2010) (contending that various stan-
dards of review obscure the relatively simple, underlying reality that courts generally review
agency actions for reasonableness).
160 Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 771, 780 (1975).
161 Id.
162 Zaring, supra note 159, at 186–87 (canvassing empirical studies of affirmance rates).
163 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 85, at 1368.
164 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
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that courts’ description of their task as “hard look review” encouraged a
mood shift toward greater scrutiny of agency action.  Still, the accumulating
empirical evidence suggests that those seeking to reform modern arbitrari-
ness review of rulemaking should examine targets other than its purported
intensity.
Along these lines, note that, in addition to purporting to modify its
intensity, the judicial transformation of arbitrariness review also restructured
this process in ways that made it far easier for plaintiffs to challenge the
rationality of agency rules while simultaneously making it more difficult for
agencies to answer these challenges.  Before the transformation, agencies
were under very little obligation during rulemaking to share information that
might be used to assess the rationality of their rules.165  As their rules were
not subject to pre-enforcement review, agencies could shift the terms of judi-
cial review in their favor by choosing their enforcement targets wisely.166
Moreover, agencies were free to rely on post hoc rationales developed during
judicial review.167  Post-transformation, all of these dynamics flipped.  By
design, the duty that courts imposed on agencies to share information during
rulemaking gave plaintiffs far greater practical capacity to challenge the
rationality of rules.168  The availability of pre-enforcement review enhanced
incentives to bring such challenges.169  Agencies’ ability to respond, by con-
trast, was constricted by expanded duties of explanation coupled with
reduced agency budgets.170  We now turn to a proposal for altering this struc-
ture in a way that retains its core benefits while reducing its burdens.
III. RESTRUCTURING ARBITRARINESS REVIEW WITH POST HOC RATIONALES
Plainly, the meaning of “arbitrariness” in the context of judicial review is
ambiguous.  This ambiguity implies that courts have the policymaking task of
structuring arbitrariness review to best serve the legitimate goals associated
with this practice.  There are many possible ways to balance these goals, and
165 See supra subsection I.B.2 (contrasting the scant notice requirements imposed by the
APA itself on notice-and-comment rulemaking with the very thorough requirements
imposed by the courts via the transformation).
166 See Pierce, supra note 40, at 7 (observing that agencies generally aimed their
enforcement actions at targets that had engaged in conduct that was “particularly egre-
gious and obviously harmful” and that “the record in such proceedings frequently
included evidence that the rule was necessary to prevent serious harm”).
167 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (discussing arbitrariness review under
Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 179 (1935)).
168 See supra subsection I.B.2 (discussing expansion of notice requirements as means of
transforming rulemaking into a quasi-adversarial process to aid courts in assessing the
rationality of rules).
169 See Pierce, supra note 40, at 7 (discussing how presumptive availability of pre-
enforcement review enhanced incentives for regulated parties to challenge agency rules).
170 See supra subsections I.C.2–3 (discussing the burdens on agency rulemaking created
by the expanded duty of contemporaneous explanation); see also Shapiro, supra note 144,
at 1150–52 (noting that agency budget constraints amplify the ossification difficulties cre-
ated by hard look review).
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judgments will naturally differ regarding which balance is best.  One familiar
balance maximizes the goal of efficient rulemaking by adopting the minimal-
ist approach of Pacific States Box in place at the time of the APA’s adoption.171
American administrative law will not be returning all the way to this policy
balance anytime soon—and it probably should not.  In 1935, when that case
was decided, legislative rulemaking, though important, had not yet become
one of the central defining features of American governance.  It may bear
noting that the rule at issue in Pacific States Box itself regulated crate sizes for
berries.172  It is hardly surprising that courts would find this lax model inade-
quate for review of the EPA’s national ambient air quality standards,
NHTSA’s regulations of auto safety, or OSHA’s workplace safety rules.
Modern arbitrariness review, by comparison, strikes a balance that gives
greater emphasis to promoting values including agency thoroughness, accu-
racy, fairness, and accountability.  As we have seen, courts accomplished this
shift by moving rulemaking toward an adversarial model.  One basic change
required agencies to expose all the technical and scientific information on
which they rely to outside scrutiny during the rulemaking process.173  A sec-
ond basic change required agencies, on promulgating a legislative rule, to
publish simultaneously a contemporaneous explanation of the rule’s basis
and purpose sufficient to respond to all material objections submitted during
the notice-and-comment process.174
We now propose an alternative balance that would preserve the ability
that challengers enjoy under modern arbitrariness review to contest rules but
at the same time make the task of agency response somewhat easier.  Specifi-
cally, courts should allow agencies to defend the rationality of their rules
based on post hoc rationales first raised during judicial review so long as the
underlying information supporting these arguments was disclosed to outside
scrutiny during the rulemaking process.  Under this approach, challengers
would continue to have the information they need to intelligently participate
in the rulemaking process as well as to provide an informed, adversarial point
of view to courts during judicial review.  At the same time, the added flexibil-
ity that the proposal concedes to agencies would reduce the excessive costs of
manufacturing exhaustive explanations for rules, reduce the incentives of
regulated parties to bloat their comments, and reduce the risk that courts will
vacate rules that, as a substantive matter, actually advance agency statutory
missions.
The biggest roadblock to adoption of this reform is likely a perception
that abandonment of the Chenery contemporaneous rationale principle in
this context is simply out of bounds.  The next two Sections show that this
move is not so heretical as it might at first sound—Chenery is a poor and
almost accidental fit with rulemaking, and courts give in to an impulse to
171 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (discussing arbitrariness review under
Pacific States Box, 296 U.S. at 179).
172 296 U.S. at 179.
173 See supra subsection I.B.2 (discussing expanded notice requirements).
174 See supra subsections I.B.4–5 (discussing expanded agency duties of explanation).
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avoid applying it with some frequency.  The third Section explains how adop-
tion of this proposal to allow agencies to rely on post hoc rationales could
improve both the rulemaking process and its judicial review.  The fourth and
last Section responds to some objections that might be leveled against this
proposal.
A. Chenery’s Poor Fit with Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
The most obvious reason to question the necessity of applying the con-
temporaneous rationale principle to arbitrariness review of notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking is its historical pedigree.  At the time of the APA’s adoption
in 1946, courts applied arbitrariness review according to the terms of Pacific
States Box, which allowed reliance on post hoc rationales.175  Courts contin-
ued this practice well into the 1960s.176
The extension of Chenery to notice-and-comment rulemaking during the
1970s had an almost accidental quality to it.  In the 1971 Overton Park deci-
sion, the Supreme Court applied the Chenery doctrine to an informal adjudi-
cation, holding that the validity of such decisions hinges on their
contemporaneous rationales.177  At about the same time, lower courts were
encountering the problem of making sense of complex, overwhelming
rulemaking “records” generated by their transformation of the notice-and-
comment process.  Under these circumstances, it was convenient for the
courts to extend Overton Park’s extension of Chenery still further to cover legis-
lative rules produced via notice and comment and also to require that the
contemporaneous rationales of such rules appear in the “concise general
statements” that agencies must publish when promulgating them.178  Agen-
cies, not courts, paid the price for this judicial convenience, most obviously
in the form of a grossly expanded duty of explanation that contradicts the
APA’s command that explanations for such rules be “concise” and “gen-
eral.”179  Courts, perhaps not surprisingly, seem to have given little systematic
thought to how they might adjust this new review regime to reduce the costs
that they externalized onto agencies.
Another obvious reason to question the migration of the contemporane-
ous rationale principle to notice-and-comment rulemaking relates to the
sheer difficulty of its demands for rules of even modest complexity.  Judging
actions based on a contemporaneous explanation of a contemporaneous
rationale reflects a reasonable and intuitive expectation for relatively simple
175 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (describing Pacific States Box-style
review and documenting its persistence).
176 See supra note 35 (documenting the persistence of Pacific States Box).
177 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (discussed in the
text accompanying note 73).
178 See supra subsection I.B.5 (discussing the extension of Chenery to informal
rulemaking).
179 See supra subsection I.B.4 (discussing the transformation of concise general state-
ments into ventilators); subsection I.C.2 (discussing the consequence of bloated concise
general statements).
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adjudications that determine legal rights based on findings of particularized,
“adjudicative facts,” i.e., facts regarding who did what to whom, where, when,
how, and why.180  We do not want immigration judges, for instance, deter-
mining whether persons may stay in the United States by rolling dice—even
if the dice sometimes happen to hit “correct” answers that can be justified
after the fact.
Agency rulemaking has quite a different character.  As Ken Davis, an
architect of the APA, pointed out several years before that statute’s adoption,
rulemaking primarily involves “legislative” facts, which are broadly applicable
propositions that underlie policy determinations.181  Examples include,
among infinite possibilities, the effects on global climate of doubling carbon
dioxide levels and determining the health effects of inhaling particulate mat-
ter.  Legislative facts are often extraordinarily complex, involving cutting-
edge issues of science and substantial uncertainty.  Compounding uncer-
tainty, many legislative facts implicate predictions of dynamic and “polycen-
tric” effects that implementation of a rule could have across society.182  Thus,
generally speaking, it is far harder for an agency to develop and publish an
exhaustive “contemporaneous rationale” for a complex rule than for a run-
of-the-mill adjudication.183
As a result, the business of applying the contemporaneous rationale
principle to complex rulemakings has a highly artificial air.  Again, no single
person on the planet, certainly not an agency head, will have read, much less
entirely absorbed and accepted, a “concise general statement of . . . basis and
purpose”184 that marches across scores or even hundreds of pages in the Fed-
eral Register.185  What the agency “thinks” about its rule is a legal construct—
just an “official story” written by agency staffers and contractors to satisfy
180 See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Pro-
cess, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942).
181 See id. at 402–03.
182 See Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 974 (1980) (observing that the record expectations of Over-
ton Park are more suited to informal adjudications than to the “polycentric policy questions
found in rulemaking”).
183 This dichotomy between complex rulemakings and relatively straightforward adjudi-
cations is not, of course, absolute.  Complex adjudications, too, can put great pressure on
the contemporaneous rationale principle.  Along these lines, it bears noting that, just a
year after issuing its first Chenery decision, the Supreme Court, without perhaps recogniz-
ing it had done so, carved out a seldom-recognized exception for cost-of-service ratemak-
ings, which are notoriously complex. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 317
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (declaring that judicial review of ratemaking should look to
the “consequences a governmental authority produces rather than the techniques it
employs”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) (holding
that, for cost-of-service ratemaking, “it is the result reached not the method employed
which is controlling”).
184 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
185 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text (explaining that interminable “con-
cise general statements” are means of protecting rules during judicial review rather than
means for explaining them).
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bureaucratic and legal demands.  This point by itself does not, of course,
show that it is a bad idea to require agencies to publish exhaustive contempo-
raneous explanations that purport to detail their contemporaneous ratio-
nales.  It highlights, however, that application of this approach should
depend on its consequences rather than a tacit acceptance that it constitutes
some “natural” way of reviewing what an agency “thought.”186
B. Dodging the Bar on Post Hoc Rationales Via Remand Without Vacation
Rigid application of the contemporaneous rationale principle to
rulemaking can create a perverse environment in which a court must reject a
rule as arbitrary even though there is an argument available that demon-
strates that the rule reasonably implements the agency’s statutory mission.
Judges have not been entirely blind to this problem.  Along these lines, writ-
ing in 1997, after decades of experience conducting modern arbitrariness
review, Judge Patricia Wald of the D.C. Circuit suggested relaxing “the ‘post
hoc rationalization’ ban prohibiting government counsel from proffering
any additional explanation for the agency action . . . even though the expla-
nation may be a winner and everyone knows that the agency would be happy
to accept it.”187
Courts have not seen fit, on a doctrinal level, to alter the bar on post hoc
rationales along the lines of Judge Wald’s suggestion.  Judicial conduct, if not
doctrine, however, has long reflected her desire to avoid vacating reasonable
rules based on curable explanatory defects.  Since 1972, the courts, in partic-
ular the D.C. Circuit, have sometimes deployed the remedy of remand with-
out vacation to avoid such outcomes even though this practice is best
understood as allowing violations of the bar on post hoc rationales.188
Remarkably, the first judge to deploy remand without vacation in this
way was none other than the father of the “hard look” himself, Judge
Leventhal.  By 1972, the judicial transformation of notice-and-comment
rulemaking was in full swing, radically increasing the burden on agencies to
explain the bases for their rules.  Taking advantage of this shift, Kennecott
Copper Corporation challenged the EPA’s adoption under the Clean Air Act
of national secondary ambient air quality standards limiting emissions of sul-
fur oxides.189  The company contended, among other charges, that the air
186 The view that Chenery’s contemporaneous rationale principle is a creature of judi-
cially-constructed common law that should be judged based on its pragmatic consequences
is not universally shared.  For an argument that this aspect of Chenery has deeper, constitu-
tional roots, see Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J.
952, 992–98 (2007) (arguing that the Chenery contemporaneous rationale rule should be
regarded as an element of the nondelegation doctrine). But see Richard Murphy, Chenery
Unmasked: Reasonable Limits on the Duty to Give Reasons, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 852–57
(2012) (critiquing Professor Stack’s argument that Chenery’s contemporaneous rationale
rule should be regarded as an element of the nondelegation doctrine).
187 Wald, supra note 16, at 666 (footnote omitted).
188 See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
189 Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J.).
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quality standards “were not adequately supported” in the agency statement of
basis and purpose.190  The court, in an opinion authored by Judge
Leventhal, agreed that the EPA had failed to explain its grounds for the pre-
cise air quality standards that it had chosen.191  The court did not, however,
vacate the rule as arbitrary.  Instead, “[i]n the interest of justice,” the court
merely remanded to the agency to allow it to provide the required explana-
tion.192  Thus, the same judge who helped lead the charge on expanding
agencies’ duties of explanation also installed a type of pressure valve in the
system, allowing a measure of flexibility regarding the timing of agency
explanations.
Since 1972, this remedy of remand without vacation has had its ups and
downs.  Initially, its use remained rare.  A detailed study recently prepared
for the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) could iden-
tify only four instances in the 1970s and four more in the 1980s in which the
D.C. Circuit deployed it.193  The need to rely on this remedy became
stronger, however, after the Supreme Court effectively barred agencies from
issuing retroactive legislative rules in 1988 in Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hospital,194 which increased the regulatory havoc that vacation of rules could
create.  As a result, use of remand without vacation increased in the early
1990s.195
In 1993, the D.C. Circuit announced the leading framework for deter-
mining whether to order remand without vacation of an “inadequately sup-
ported rule.”196  The reviewing court should consider both: (a) “the
seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether
the agency chose correctly),” as well as (b) “the disruptive consequences of
190 Id. at 847.
191 Id. at 849–50 (citing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416,
420 (1971); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943)).
192 Id. at 851 n.21 (stating that standards would “remain in effect pending amplifica-
tion of basis on remand and further review by this court”).
193 STEPHANIE J. TATHAM, THE UNUSUAL REMEDY OF REMAND WITHOUT VACATUR 2 n.15,
58 app. (2014) (citing Nat’l Treasure Emps. Union v. Horner, 854 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Nat’l Coal. Against the Misuse of Pesticides, 809 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Mary-
land People’s Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1985); American Fed’n of Gov’t
Emps., AFL-CIO v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551
F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Kennecott, 462 F.2d at 846)).
194 488 U.S. 204 (1988).  Strictly speaking, Georgetown merely requires a clear statement
of authorization from Congress for retroactive legislative rulemaking.  In practice, the
effect of this clear statement rule has been to bar such retroactivity. See William V.
Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE L.J. 106, 110 (“Bowen’s
practical impact . . . may indeed be great as agencies choose to avoid the risk of invalida-
tion of their actions by refusing to act or by opting for the adjudicatory process for
policymaking.”).
195 TATHAM, supra note 193, at 5; see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 75–78 (1995)  (connecting the rise in use of remand
without vacation to Georgetown’s limitation on retroactive rulemaking).
196 Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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an interim change that may itself be changed.”197  The first of these prongs
leaves space for a court to avoid vacating a rule that the hard look would
regard as “arbitrary” due to some explanatory mistake or gap.  The second
prong, logically enough, instructs courts to consider the policy implications
of vacation in deciding whether to order it.  A year later, in 1994, Judge Wald
described remand without vacation as her court’s “general practice” where
an agency has failed to supply adequate reasons in support of its action.198  A
number of scholars, notably including Professor Pierce, welcomed this rem-
edy for its potential to ameliorate the problem of ossification of
rulemaking.199
Notwithstanding Judge Wald’s enthusiastic characterization, remand
without vacation did not remain the court’s “general practice”—if, indeed, it
ever was.  Writing about a decade later in 2003, Professor Ronald Levin
observed that the D.C. Circuit “used the device fairly selectively, probably in
part because of the questions that have been raised about its propriety.”200
Eleven years later, Stephanie Tatham, writing in a report for ACUS, con-
firmed Levin’s assessment, documenting that the D.C. Circuit uses this rem-
edy “only a few times a year” and that other circuits do so very
infrequently.201
Concerns over the legality of remand without vacation found their lead-
ing expressions in opinions by two judges of the D.C. Circuit, Judges Ran-
dolph and Sentelle.  Both of these judges have emphasized that the plain text
of section 706(2) of the APA instructs courts to “set aside” agency actions that
they determine are “arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful.”202  Accord-
ingly, once a court determines an action is “arbitrary,” it must ultimately
order vacation.  Most D.C. Circuit judges, however, employ this remedy with
little apparent concern for this legal objection.203  Still, its relatively rare use
197 Id. at 150–51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Int’l Union, United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Admin., 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir.
1990)).
198 Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Prob-
lem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 638 n.72 (1994).
199 Pierce, supra note 195.
200 Levin, supra note 19, at 295 n.11.
201 TATHAM, supra note 193, at 29.
202 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 10–12 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Randolph, J., concur-
ring) (“I continue to believe that whenever a reviewing court finds an administrative rule
or order unlawful, the Administrative Procedure Act requires the court to vacate the
agency’s action.”); Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. EPA, 374 F.3d 1363, 1373–74 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(Sentelle, J., writing for the panel) (holding that the judicial review provision of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2012), bars remand without vacation of illegal rules),
withdrawn in relevant part by 393 F.3d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman,
310 F.3d 747, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (insisting that, once a court has
determined that an agency’s explanation for its action is inadequate, the APA requires
vacation); Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 490–91 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J.); see also
In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Griffith, J., concurring)
(questioning “the wisdom of the open-ended remand without vacatur”).
203 TATHAM, supra note 193, at 7.
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may, as Professor Levin has suggested, reflect lingering doubts over whether
courts should leave rules that are, by hypothesis, “illegal” in effect for indefi-
nite periods as agencies address their flaws.204
Continued deployment of remand without vacation, notwithstanding
legal objections, is certainly attributable to the compelling policy reasons sup-
porting its use.  Vacation due to a readily curable defect is unreasonable
where it would cause severe disruption to a regulatory program.  It is also
attributable to Professor Levin’s thorough analysis in “Vacation” at Sea: Judi-
cial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law.205  That article doc-
uments a long history of courts invoking equitable remedial discretion to
justify leaving government actions in force even after a court has determined
that they are legally defective.206  In Levin’s view, the section 706(2) com-
mand that courts “set aside” “arbitrary” actions does not overcome a “long-
standing judicial presumption that militates against a finding that Congress
has placed curbs on the courts’ remedial discretion.”207  The upshot of this
analysis is that a court has legal authority under the APA (or similarly worded
statutes) to determine that an agency rule is “arbitrary” but to nevertheless
leave it in place while an agency works to cure its defects.  Given the impor-
tance of remand without vacation, Professor Levin’s development of a ratio-
nale for upholding this practice that a willing judicial mind might follow is a
significant and highly praiseworthy accomplishment of legal scholarship.
Following his lead, ACUS has recently adopted an official recommendation
that “[r]emand without vacatur should continue to be recognized as within
the court’s equitable remedial authority.”208
We nonetheless submit that there is a more illuminating way to think
about the courts’ use of remand without vacation that avoids the problematic
premise that this remedy upholds agency actions that have been found to be
“arbitrary.”  Functionally speaking, this remedy allows a rule to remain in
force after a court has determined that its contemporaneous rationale is
legally defective.  Viewed from this angle, remand without vacation would
seem plainly to violate Chenery’s bar on post hoc rationales.209  It also, how-
204 Levin, supra note 19, at 295.
205 Id.
206 See generally id. at 315–44.
207 Id. at 310.
208 ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION NO. 2013-6, REMAND WITHOUT VACA-
TUR 5 (2013).
209 Professor Levin avoids this result by explaining that, where a court orders remand
without vacation, it does not substitute its own rationale to justify upholding the agency’s
original action on a permanent basis.  Rather, the court, based on equitable considera-
tions, exercises its own judicial authority and discretion to leave the agency action in place
temporarily, allowing the agency itself to determine whether to permanently rehabilitate it.
Levin, supra note 19, at 371–73.  At the end of the day, however, remand without vacation,
according to the mainstream characterization, leaves an illegal agency policy in place—one
that a court would lack authority to order on its own authority—because a court, not the
agency, thinks it is a good idea to do so.  It therefore violates the Chenery rationale that,
where courts uphold discretionary agency actions based on judicial rationales, they run the
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ever, indicates that courts, on some level, think that these violations are justi-
fied in light of the policy implications of outright vacation.  In other words,
remand without vacation occurs where a court concludes that it is better, on
balance, to leave a rule in force while the agency develops a post hoc fix
rather than to disrupt the agency’s regulatory program by vacating a rule.
A first step to putting this approach on a sound legal footing is to give
proper attention to the obvious historical fact that courts have adjusted the
meaning of “arbitrariness” over time to reflect evolving policy concerns relat-
ing to rulemaking and its judicial review.210  These concerns include, among
other interrelated goals, ensuring legality, rationality, accuracy, thorough-
ness, accountability, broad participation, and fairness.  Of course, agency effi-
ciency and effectiveness are also critical and legitimate factors—Congress,
after all, creates agencies to get things done.
Modern, “hard look” review for arbitrariness struck one particular bal-
ance among these interrelated factors.  One key element of this balance has
been a judicial insistence that an agency rule is “arbitrary” unless it is accom-
panied on promulgation by an exhaustive explanation of the agency’s con-
temporaneous rationale that includes a response to any comments that a
court deems significant.211  This expanded burden of explanation furthers
legitimate values that include, among others, agency accountability, accuracy,
and fairness.  It also, however, creates difficulties where an agency rule is
“arbitrary,” in the limited sense that it suffers from a notable explanatory
flaw, but this flaw does not seem so serious as to justify the regulatory havoc
of vacation.
Remand without vacation demonstrates that, in this type of situation,
courts perceive that the black-letter doctrine of modern arbitrariness review
gives too little weight to the critical values of agency effectiveness and effi-
ciency.  The fact that the courts themselves designed the system of modern
arbitrariness review that strikes this maladjusted balance suggests that they
should also be able to alter course to strike a better balance that gives these
values more weight.  Making this move opens up the possibility that a court
can conclude that a rule suffers from explanatory defects significant enough
to justify requiring a post hoc agency response—yet not so significant as to
justify condemnation as “arbitrary.”  Seen in this light, remand without vaca-
tion is not a matter of a court determining that it would be best for it to use
its own authority to impose an arbitrary rule that an agency failed to promul-
risk of infringing agency discretion.  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 94–95 (1943);
cf. Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)
(rejecting remand without vacation because “when we hold that the conclusion heretofore
improperly reached should remain in effect, we are substituting our decision of an appro-
priate resolution for that of the agency to whom the proposition was legislatively
entrusted”).
210 See generally supra Section I.B (describing the judicial transformation of notice-and-
comment rulemaking).
211 See supra subsection I.B.4 (describing how the expanded duty to explain rules that
courts imposed on agencies turned “concise general statements” into “ventilators”).
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gate legally.  Rather, it involves a court concluding that a rule, notwithstand-
ing some noteworthy and apparently curable flaws, is not “arbitrary” and then
upholding it on the condition that the agency develop post hoc fixes for the
defects.
Although this model is not the mainstream way of defending the legality
of remand without vacation, it does find some support from the first major
judicial debate over this remedy in Checkosky v. SEC.212  Judge Randolph, dis-
senting, insisted that remand without vacation is illegal because actions that
are “arbitrary” due to a defective explanation must be “set aside” under sec-
tion 706(2).213  Judge Silberman’s response denied the premise that a court
must “decide that the agency’s action is either unlawful or lawful on the first
pass, even when the judges are unsure as to the answer because they are not
confident that they have discerned the agency’s full rationale.”214  Instead,
where a court is in doubt concerning the basis for an agency’s action, the
court can remand without vacating to give the agency a chance to explain
itself.215
This model for justifying remand without vacation by adjusting the
meaning of “arbitrariness” to match judicial conduct is attractive for a series
of reasons.  First, remand without vacation can leave an agency action in
place for an indefinite period that can last years, imposing significant bur-
dens on regulated entities during all that time.216  Notwithstanding the tradi-
tion of equitable remedial discretion, it is odd to contemplate that a court
has independent power to impose these sorts of burdens after it has deter-
mined that the agency with regulatory authority over the area has failed to
exercise its authority legally.217  Second, characterizing remand without vaca-
tion as a device for saving “illegal” agency actions suggests this remedy should
be exceptional and disfavored, which may explain its relative rarity.218  To
our minds, however, remand without vacation provides a sensible means of
helping to accommodate the explanatory burdens that courts themselves
212 Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
213 Id. at 490–91 (Randolph, J., dissenting in part).
214 Id. at 462 (Silberman, J.).
215 Id.  It bears noting that Judge Silberman, consistent with Chenery, contemplated use
of remand without vacation to obtain more complete explanations of agencies’ contempo-
raneous rationales rather than post hoc rationales. See id. at 463–64.
216 See In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Griffith, J., con-
curring) (noting that FCC failed to act on remand without vacation for over six years); Nat.
Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting in
part) (criticizing delays of ten and fifteen years).
217 The bounds on judicial equitable remedial discretion are not rigid, just as one
would expect.  Levin, supra note 19, at 332.  Still, contexts in which it has been applied
have often involved technical violations of law, situations where the court contemplates
leaving an “illegal” rule or statute in place for a short period, or situations where the court
determines that the plaintiff’s substantive rights will not be infringed. Id. at 326–44.
Remand without vacation for an indefinite period of a rule that imposes substantial obliga-
tions would thus seem to press the limits of judicial equitable remedial discretion.
218 See TATHAM, supra note 193, at 22 (discussing the relative rarity of remand without
vacation).
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have imposed on agencies, and its use should be encouraged.  Third, this
model corrects a semantic oddity in current usage of the term “arbitrary.”
Whatever else it might mean, this term should connote strong condemna-
tion—certainly, this is what Congress must have had in mind back in 1946
when it adopted the APA and Pacific States Box provided the expected stan-
dard for review.219  By contrast, to call an agency rule “arbitrary” seems inapt
where its only fault is failure to include in a “concise general statement” an
adequate response to a comment that a reviewing court later happens to
deem significant.  Fourth, and on a closely related point, the proposed model
enables courts to reserve condemnation for arbitrariness to those rules that
they conclude should, in fact, be vacated based on all relevant considera-
tions.  The model thus allows courts to follow the section 706(2) instruction
to “set aside” those agency actions that they find “arbitrary” without
complication.220
Finally and most importantly, this way of justifying remand without vaca-
tion highlights an attractive, more flexible way of thinking about arbitrariness
review.  Again, the ambiguity of the term “arbitrary” inevitably leaves courts
with discretion to construe it in light of the values and goals that they recog-
nize should be served by rulemaking and its judicial review.  One can think of
the judicial transformation of notice-and-comment rulemaking and the
development of modern arbitrariness review as an exercise of this discre-
tion—one that struck a particular policymaking balance that sought to
enhance values such as agency accountability, fairness, and broad participa-
tion, among others.  The practice of remand without vacation suggests that
courts themselves have perceived that this balance should be pushed back in
the direction of enhancing agency efficiency and effectiveness.
C. Striking a Better Balance with Judge Wald’s Twenty-Year-Old Suggestion
The courts’ deployment of remand without vacation, best understood
and justified, demonstrates that they are, contra Chenery, more hospitable to
post hoc rationales than they commonly admit.  This judicial flexibility, even
if generally unacknowledged, is broadly consistent with the historical devel-
opment of judicial review of agency action.  The drafters of the APA used
broad, vague language to govern judicial review pursuant to their super-stat-
ute, leaving later interpreters the task of determining how best to expound
and apply it.221  Courts have used this implicit policymaking discretion to
radically transform notice-and-comment rulemaking and, as part of this pro-
cess, installed Chenery as an element of modern arbitrariness review.
Although the application of the Chenery doctrine to informal rulemaking has
219 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (discussing Pacific States Box’s
extremely lax standard of review for arbitrariness, which in turn indicates that “arbitrary” is
a term of strong condemnation).
220 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
221 See Levin, supra note 19, at 312 (noting that “the draftsmanship of section 706 as a
whole suggests that Congress expected courts to flesh out its meaning over time”).
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now been in place for decades, it need not be regarded as “carved in
stone.”222  Instead, the courts’ approach to arbitrariness review should con-
tinue to evolve in light of new circumstances and learning.
Recognizing these points naturally invites exploration of how else agen-
cies and courts might use post hoc rationales to improve rulemaking and its
judicial review.  Our own inquiry on this point has led us to a proposal that
Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit sketched in a brief paragraph nearly twenty
years ago: courts should allow agencies to raise new, post hoc arguments sup-
porting the rationality of their rules during judicial review so long as those
arguments are based on information exposed to public scrutiny during the
rulemaking process itself.223  Adopting this proposal would advance the val-
ues of agency effectiveness and efficiency while doing very little to under-
mine the system’s capacity to deliver on other important values served by
modern arbitrariness review, such as accountability, fairness, and participa-
tion.  Put another way, the proposal strikes a better balance than the status
quo insofar as it creates real advantages at very little or no cost.
As a threshold matter, it is helpful to emphasize aspects of modern judi-
cial review of rulemaking that the proposal does not alter.  Again, viewed
from a high-level, structural perspective, the judicial transformation of
rulemaking made it both easier for outsiders to challenge the rationality of
rules and harder for agencies to answer such challenges.  The main mecha-
nisms for easing the task of challenging rules were to require that agencies’
proposed rules bear a close resemblance to their final rules and that agencies
share all relevant scientific and technical information in their possession with
outsiders during the rulemaking process.224  The theory of modern arbitrari-
ness review is that, armed with this information, outsiders can both comment
effectively on agency data and reasoning during rulemaking and later, if nec-
essary, mount effective challenges during judicial review that provide gener-
alist courts with information they need to judge complex, technical rules.  By
requiring that post hoc rationales be based on information shared during the
rulemaking process, the proposal preserves the role of these disclosure mech-
anisms, ensuring that the factual bases of rules will continue to be subject to
intense, adversarial scrutiny by interested outsiders.  The proposal thus does
little if anything to interfere with the benefits of accountability, accuracy, fair-
ness, and broad participation that such scrutiny is supposed to bring.
The proposal’s benefits relate to easing agencies’ task of answering chal-
lenges to their rules.  Most obviously, allowing limited use of post hoc ratio-
nales would ease the pressure that courts have imposed on agencies to
222 The phrase “not . . . carved in stone” is borrowed from Chevron, which teaches that
agency statutory constructions should evolve as agencies learn.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984).  With due regard for the role of stare
decisis, this strikes us as good advice for courts as well.
223 See Wald, supra note 16 (criticizing rigid application of the contemporaneous ratio-
nale principle and suggesting relaxation).
224 See supra subsections I.B.2, I.C.1 (discussing the expanded notice requirements
imposed on agencies by courts).
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accompany their rules with “concise general statements” that are exhaustive
and lengthy enough to answer any comments that a risk-averse agency fears a
generalist court might deem significant enough to merit an answer.225  For
those who think that statutes should be implemented as written, it bears not-
ing that altering the timing of agencies’ duty to explain their rules in this way
would encourage them to publish explanations that are both more “concise”
and more “general”—as Congress told them to do seventy years ago in the
APA.226
More subtly, adoption of the proposal would change the incentives of
potential challengers in positive ways both during the notice-and-comment
process and during judicial review.  Under the current system, outside parties
have the incentive to overwhelm agencies with comments.227  Responding to
complex comments takes time, which slows the regulatory process—to the
benefit of those who would rather not be regulated.  Also, adding to the com-
ment pile increases the chance that the agency’s concise general statement
will suffer from some explanatory gap that, notwithstanding occasional
deployment of remand without vacation, will lead a court to set aside the
rule.  Outside parties in a position to manipulate the process in this way will
generally, of course, be composed of well-funded, corporate interests, com-
pounding problems of access and inequality.228
Allowing agencies to offer post hoc rationales based on record informa-
tion would change this calculus substantially.  For one thing, agencies would
not have to expend so much time and energy bullet-proofing their concise
general statements against any and all conceivable objections during judicial
review.  This change would therefore reduce the ability of regulated entities
to slow rulemaking through excessive comments.
More significantly, the proposal would reduce the “reward” that petition-
ers should expect to win by setting up an agency for explanatory failure dur-
ing the rulemaking process.  Rather than vacation, the initial reward for
identifying an explanatory gap during judicial review would generally be to
obtain a post hoc explanation from the agency filling that gap.  By itself,
winning a post hoc explanation might be called the litigation equivalent of a
Pyrrhic victory, not worth pursuing.  Vacation would be the reward only
where an agency could not, based on record information, provide a reasona-
ble post hoc explanation.  Reducing the expected reward for tripping up
agencies would discourage potential challengers from submitting comments
225 See supra subsection I.C.3 (discussing the problem of bloated concise general
statements).
226 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012); cf. Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227,
246 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that, “[p]ut
bluntly,” the expanded disclosure requirements that courts imposed on agencies to explain
rules “cannot be squared with the text of § 553 of the APA”).
227 See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (discussing this problem of “informa-
tion excess”).
228 Cf. Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic
Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 124–29 (2011) (documenting that regulated
interests dominate contacts with EPA during rulemaking).
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in the first place or seeking judicial review later, except where their objec-
tions are so serious that they conclude that the agency cannot offer a rational
answer.
In addition, the proposal would protect rules that advance agency statu-
tory missions from vacation based on curable explanatory defects.  It would,
in other words, provide a more thorough means of carrying out the protec-
tive function currently handled somewhat spottily by remand without vaca-
tion.  Where an agency can provide a reasonable explanation based on
record information demonstrating that its rule advances its statutory mission,
a court should not order vacation unless doing so demonstrably and substan-
tially serves some other legitimate goal.
Lastly, all of these advantages of allowing post hoc rationales to justify
rules must be understood in light of the reality that agencies operate under
considerable resource constraints in terms of both budget and personnel.  If
agencies do not have to perfect their concise general statements, respond to
so many comments, or defend so many lawsuits, they will be able to save
scarce resources for work on other agency priorities, further promoting
agency effectiveness.
D. Defusing Some Objections
Earlier, we set the stage for our proposal to relax the bar on post hoc
rationales by arguing generally both that Chenery’s contemporaneous ratio-
nale principle fits complex rulemaking poorly and that the courts have given
little apparent thought regarding how to adjust it for this demanding con-
text.  Applying the contemporaneous rationale principle does, however, gen-
erate certain advantages—some described in the Chenery opinion itself and
some identified in later caselaw and commentary.  This final subsection
explains why these advantages do not provide a sound basis for rejecting the
proposal.
1. Avoiding Infringement on Agency Discretion
One of the Court’s primary grounds for adopting Chenery’s contempora-
neous rationale principle was, rather ironically, to protect agency policymak-
ing authority from judicial infringement.229  Again, the theory here is that,
where a reviewing court determines that an agency’s discretionary rationale is
defective but affirms on the basis of an alternative developed by the court,
the court necessarily infringes on the agency’s authority to develop its own
rationale to support the action or to choose a different action.230
229 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 94–95 (1943).
230 See id. at 94 (observing that “[i]t is not for us to determine independently what is
‘detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers’ or ‘fair or
equitable’ within the meaning” of the statute that the SEC was charged with implementing
(quoting Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 §§ 7, 11, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (repealed
2005)).
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The most obvious problem with this purported benefit is that vacation of
an agency action is hardly necessary to obtain it.  The courts could instead
simply insist that agencies clearly signal their acceptance of any post hoc
rationale before a court considers it.  Moreover, in the case of notice-and-
comment rulemaking, such approval should not require any particular pro-
cess by the agency.  Under the APA, as courts have interpreted it, outsiders
have the right to comment on a proposed rule that is close in form to the
agency’s final rule as well as to comment on any supporting information that
agency has in its possession.231  They do not, as part of the rulemaking itself,
have any statutory right to comment on the rationale that the agency offers
in support of the rule on its publication.  The APA contemplates that peti-
tioners seeking to challenge such a rationale will do so via judicial review.  As
such, agencies ought to be able to offer post hoc rationales based on infor-
mation that they have already disclosed as part of the rulemaking process
without, for instance, offering challengers an additional chance to comment.
2. Orderly Judicial Review and the Sandbagging Problem
Chenery’s second stated ground for its contemporaneous rationale princi-
ple is that it is necessary for orderly judicial review.232  Certainly, it is true
that the Chenery principle aids courts by limiting which rationales are subject
to review.  It is also clear, however, that courts could conduct orderly review
and still allow post hoc rationales.  Petitioners could continue, as is currently
the case, to seek judicial review on issues raised during the notice-and-com-
ment process.  Agencies would then be able to respond based on arguments
expressed either in a concise general statement (as under current practice)
or based on record information to which the petitioners had access.  Petition-
ers would be able to respond to these arguments in their replies.
One might object that the preceding sketch is unfair to petitioners
because they might decide to petition for review of a rule based on an
agency’s failure to respond to a comment and then find out to their dismay
during judicial review that the agency has a very good and unexpected post
hoc response.  Agencies would, in a word, “sandbag” challengers of their
rules.  This objection seems overblown after reflection on the nature of
rulemaking litigation and the limited nature of the proposal.  First off, agen-
cies would have little incentive to sandbag as such.  Much of the point of the
instant proposal is, of course, to relieve agencies of some of the burden of
explanation that courts have imposed on rulemaking.  Still, where a com-
ment presents a notable substantive issue, it will be in an agency’s interest to
demonstrate during rulemaking that it has a sufficient response to discour-
age litigation.
231 See supra subsections I.B.2, I.C.1 (discussing parameters of expanded notice
requirements).
232 Chenery, 318 U.S. at 94 (“[T]he orderly functioning of the process of review requires
that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and ade-
quately sustained.”).
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Moreover, especially in complex, technical environments, the real play-
ers in litigation are well-funded, corporate interests and, to a lesser extent,
sophisticated public interest groups.233  In general, these interests should be
very tough to sandbag given that they know a great deal about the genuine
issues at stake.  The proposal’s requirement that post hoc rationales be based
on information shared with the public during the rulemaking process pro-
vides further assurance that agencies will not be able to “hide the ball” when
dealing with such sophisticated players.  In any event, where an agency none-
theless manages to sandbag a challenger, a court could cure the problem
rather easily and thoroughly by allowing another round of briefing.
3. Ensuring Agency Sincerity
One might object that post hoc rationales, in the hurly-burly of litiga-
tion, are likely to be nothing more than post hoc rationalizations.  Such a
“rationalization” would be merely an argument of convenience for litigation
purposes rather than something the agency “really” believed.  The bar on
post hoc rationales is thus necessary to protect agency sincerity.
This criticism rests on a naı̈ve portrait of decisionmaking by agencies (or
even by individuals, for that matter).  As noted above, no single person on
the planet likely reads, digests, and approves of truly massive “concise general
statements” that agencies must produce for complex rules.234  In such a situa-
tion, the difference between legitimate “rationale” and illegitimate “rationali-
zation” is hardly clear.
Furthermore, this argument fails to give due consideration to the fact
that most of the real policymaking that occurs through informal rulemaking
precedes formal commencement of notice and comment.  By requiring that
agencies’ final rules closely resemble their proposed rules, courts have, in
effect, required agencies to make something close to final policymaking deci-
sions before issuing their proposals.235  Shoving policymaking into the
shadows of the pre-notice period is problematic for a number of reasons—
including that it magnifies the influence of special interests.236  Most to the
present point, requiring agencies to make large investments in their pro-
posed rules makes them difficult for agencies to abandon.  This means, ironi-
cally enough, that the concise general statements that agencies publish as
contemporaneous rationales of their final rules might be better regarded as post
233 See Wagner et al., supra note 228, at 123–32 (documenting dominance by regulated
industries of participation in technical rulemaking by the EPA).
234 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text (emphasizing that many “concise
general statements” are far too large for any given person to absorb, which is not their
point in any event).
235 See supra subsection I.C.1 (explaining that the expanded notice requirements courts
have imposed on agencies have, rather perversely, shoved agency policymaking back into
the pre-notice period of rulemaking).
236 See Wagner et al., supra note 228, at 124–28 (documenting that regulated interests
dominate pre-notice contacts with agencies in technical rulemaking).
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hoc rationalizations of their proposed rules.  They are, in large part, exercises
in justification.
In short, given the complex, bureaucratic nature of rulemaking, ratio-
nalizations should be accepted as inevitable rather than condemned.  Agency
rules should be tested by their reasonability, not by agency sincerity.
4. Ensuring That Commenters Can Meaningfully Affect Rulemaking
A closely related argument is that allowing an agency to wait until judi-
cial review to offer responses to comments robs commenters of genuine
power to influence the shaping of rules in a meaningful way.  The theory
here might be that, if an agency has to respond to a comment during the
rulemaking process itself, then there is still time for that comment to actually
inform the agency’s policymaking decision.  Once the policy decision has
been set in concrete as a final rule, the agency, not wishing to upset its own
applecart, will not be willing to give genuine consideration to other options
and will instead defend its chosen rule to the last.  Allowing post hoc ratio-
nales would thus tend to turn notice and comment into a sham.
Our first and main response to this argument is that, as just discussed,
policymaking give-and-take is largely done by the time the notice-and-com-
ment process commences.237  The proposal to allow post hoc rationales can
do little to undermine a purported benefit of notice and comment that does
not actually exist—at least not to any great degree.  Second, if an agency
ignores a truly significant comment to which it cannot offer a reasonable
answer, then it still runs the risk of vacation.  Lastly, assuming for the sake of
argument that a complete bar on post hoc rationales somehow, to some
degree, enables the notice-and-comment process to have more policymaking
impact, this benefit must be weighed against the considerable mischief that
this bar creates.
5. Protecting Against Agency Laziness
Yet another argument for the bar on post hoc rationales is that it forces
agencies to take greater care when crafting their rules.238  Certainly, it stands
to reason that agencies will canvass and answer comments more carefully if
failure to do so might eliminate years of work.  It is not clear, however, that
this extra work improves rules to a degree that its benefits justify the costs.
At the outset, it bears noting that barring post hoc rationales to force
agencies to take more care in assembling contemporaneous explanations for
their rules runs counter to a whole body of judicial precedents declaring that
237 See supra subsection I.C.1 (discussing how expanded notice requirements encourage
agencies to make policy decisions before issuing notices of proposed rules).
238 See Note, supra note 16, at 1926–29 (noting and criticizing this argument).
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agencies, not courts, are best situated to allocate scarce agency resources and
that agencies should be left to do so free of judicial intervention.239
In any event, adoption of the instant proposal would still leave strong
incentives in place for agencies to avoid significant errors as they craft rules.
Once again, the judicial transformation of rulemaking has forced agencies to
do most of their real work of policymaking before notice and comment for-
mally begins.240  Allowing limited use of post hoc rationales during judicial
review would not alter the incentives of agencies to make major investments
in developing their proposed rules in the first place.  Moreover, courts have
discretionary power to enjoin the enforcement of rules during judicial
review.241  In deciding whether to wield this power, a court should be able to
give weight to an agency’s egregious failure to explain a rule, e.g., where an
agency ignores an obviously powerful objection.  Finally, at the end of the
day, an agency’s rationales for a rule, regardless of whether they first appear
in the concise general statement or are post hoc, remain subject to review for
arbitrariness.  If an agency cannot offer a reasonable justification for its rule,
a court can vacate it.
CONCLUSION
Over the last seventy years since adoption of the APA, the procedures
governing legislative rulemaking have become relentlessly more complex
and burdensome.  Courts took the lead in this process, radically expanding
agencies’ duties of notice and explanation.  The primary mechanism for this
change has been aggressive construction of the APA’s command in section
706(2) that courts set aside “arbitrary” agency actions.  Courts have required
agencies to publish all supporting scientific and technical information in
their possession supporting proposed rules and effectively imposed a require-
ment that final rules be very similar to proposed rules.242  At the same time,
courts have held that an agency’s “concise general statement . . . of basis and
purpose” supporting a rule must include a persuasive response to all signifi-
cant comments submitted during the notice-and-comment process.243  Incor-
porating a variant of the Chenery contemporaneous rationale principle,
courts have generally barred agencies from supplementing these concise gen-
239 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (“The agency is far better equipped
than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its
priorities.”).
240 See supra subsection I.C.1 (explaining that agencies are incentivized to make policy
decisions prior to issuing notices of proposed rules, due to the expanded notice
requirements).
241 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012).
242 Supra subsections I.B.2, I.C.1 (discussing judicial expansion of notice
requirements).
243 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing agency obligation to respond
to comments).
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eral statements with post hoc rationales.244  An agency rule that fails to satisfy
these explanatory requirements is subject to condemnation as “arbitrary.”
Together, these reforms have created a structure that makes it easier for
outsiders to challenge rules effectively and more difficult for agencies to
defend them.  They also represent a particular balance that courts have
struck among various legitimate values served by rulemaking and its judicial
review, e.g., accountability, transparency, fairness, rationality, thoroughness,
effectiveness, and efficiency.  As the evolution of modern arbitrariness review
emphatically confirms, striking this balance implicates a type of judicial
discretion.
Building on a suggestion that Judge Wald made two decades ago,245 this
Article proposes that courts exercise this discretion to strike a new, improved
balance that enhances agency effectiveness and efficiency without signifi-
cantly undermining values such as accountability, accuracy, and fairness.
Specifically, contrary to current doctrine, courts should allow agencies to
defend the rationality of their rules based on post hoc rationales so long as
they are based on information exposed to outside scrutiny during the notice-
and-comment process.  This reform leaves in place the expanded notice
requirements of modern arbitrariness review, ensuring that outsiders would
continue to obtain the information that they need to challenge agency rules
effectively during rulemaking or judicial review.  It would, at the same time,
lessen distortions caused by strained application of the contemporaneous
rationale principle to rulemaking, reducing agency incentives to “over-
explain” their rules, reducing the incentives of outsiders to bloat the notice-
and-comment process, and reducing the risk of vacation of rules that ration-
ally advance agency statutory missions.
244 See supra subsection I.B.5 (discussing the judicial imposition of Chenery’s contempo-
raneous rationale principle on notice-and-comment rulemaking).
245 Wald, supra note 16, at 666.
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